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Abstract 
The United States has repeatedly attempted to stop tax base erosion for almost 
the entire post-World War I era, and yet the same problems exist today.  The need for 
fundamental tax reform is front-page material in the major newspapers with the US 
transfer pricing rules and US multinationals portrayed as public enemy #1.  The OECD 
this month issued a report entitled “Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting,” and in 
a competing fashion several important developing countries have initiated their own pact 
to develop cooperative strategies on these issues outside of the framework of the OECD 
and UN. 
 The attached manuscript studies the historical record and sets forth a competing 
model for dealing with these matters which pre-dated the existing model treaties and 
transfer pricing paradigm.  This earlier paradigm was offered by the International 
Chamber of Commerce’s but was prematurely abandoned by the League of Nations in 
favor of the existing paradigm.  In light of the fact that the existing paradigm has failed 
so miserably, the earlier proposal should be re-considered. 
In the inevitable re-examination process, there will be a fascinating range of 
political, economic, and business issues to be addressed. Tax administrations will need to 
ascertain how their resources could be redeployed to foster economic growth. MNEs will 
need to assess the impact of new treaty concepts on their global effective tax rate 
planning models.   
The critical question is who will initiate the evolution to come. All countries are 
anxious to protect their respective tax bases. At the present time, it appears that the 
BRICS and Source Countries have planted their stake in the sand, rejecting the existing 
order and declaring an intention to update the rules that apply to their own tax base 
defense. The OECD appears to be principally driven by the need to defend its Member 
country tax bases, hoping, no doubt, that BRICS and Source Countries will ultimately 
follow its lead.  Whichever organization emerges as the new-found thought leader on 
these questions, it is now time to give the original International Chamber of Commerce 
recommendation a fair consideration on its merits (which, interestingly, addresses the 
current concerns of BRICS and Source Countries).  
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Professor of Law at the University of Houston Law Center.   
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partner in McDermott Will & Emery and Vice Chair of the Taxation Commission of the International 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is rare that the global effective tax rate strategies of multinational corporations 
(“MNEs”) become priority topics for financial center newspapers and magazines.  It is 
even rarer that such matters become features in the popular press; yet this has become 
commonplace in recent years.  For example, a recent story declared that a prominent 
MNE’s 3.2 percent effective tax rate has put it “at the forefront of mounting political 
anger about multinationals that shift profits to low tax jurisdictions.”1 
Not surprisingly, the tax authorities of the world, including the predominant 
inter-governmental or country groups, namely the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) and the United Nations (“UN”), have 
announced their intention to address these issues.  For example, the European 
Commission has unveiled plans to “crack down on tax havens and aggressive tax 
planning by companies” as one means of helping EU states recover from their economic 
downturns. 2   Similarly, the G-8 and G-20 groups have asked the OECD to review 
applicable rules to reduce the ability of MNEs to shift profits (i.e., base erosion).3  The 
OECD has responded by releasing a report that attempts to address the problems of base 
erosion and profit shifting but does so without fundamentally re-examining the existing 
tax treaty paradigm.4  In the United States, treasury officials make similar declarations, 
advising that any broad tax reform must be focused on the base erosion fight.5  There is 
                                                 
1 See Vanessa Houlder, Google moves $9.8bn revenues to Bermuda, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2012, at 
18 (“Google earns ‘substantially all’ its foreign income in Ireland, according to its annual report, but holds its 
non-U.S. intellectual property in Bermuda”), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/87c1f98a-4455-11e 
2-932a-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=intl#axzz2hxqlIuxB.  See also Wake Up and Smell the Coffee, 
ECONOMIST, Dec. 15, 2012, at 66; Szu Ping Chan, Facebook Funneled Nearly Half a Billion Into the Cayman 
Islands Last Year, The Daily Telegraph (Dec. 23, 2012), available at http://www.businessinsider.com/facebo 
ok-funneled-nearly-half-a-billion-pounds-in-the-cayman-islands-last-year-2012-12; Rupert Neate, Facebook 
paid £2.9m tax on £840m profits made outside US, figures show, GUARDIAN (Dec. 23, 2012), available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/dec/23/facebook-tax-profits-outside-us; Charles Duhigg, Inquiry 
Into Tech Giants’ Tax Stategies Nears End, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2013) (reporting that Congressional 
investigators are wrapping up an inquiry into the accounting practices of Apple and other technology 
companies that allocate revenue and intellectual property offshore to lower their US taxes), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/04/business/an-inquiry-into-tech-giants-tax-strategies-nears-an-end.html 
?_r=2&.  
2 See Joe Kirwin, European Commission to Crack Down on Tax Havens, Corporate Loopholes, 
DAILY TAX REP., Dec. 6, 2012, at I-2, available at Bloomberg BNA No. 234.  In the case of Starbucks, it was 
so concerned about adverse publicity in the U.K. that it announced an intention to voluntarily not take 
deductions for royalties and other payments streams as a means of commencing a “process of enhancing trust 
with customers . . . .”  See An Open Letter From Kris Engskov, Managing Director of Starbucks Coffee 
Company UK, STARBUCKS.COM (Dec. 6, 2012), http://www.starbucks.com/blog/an-open-letter-from-kris-engs 
kov/1249. The making of such “voluntary adjustments” can create a wide-range of problems for all parties, 
including respective tax authorities.  See Cym H. Lowell, Peter L. Briger & Mark R. Martin, U.S. 
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING ¶ 4.02[3] (2012). 
3 See Kevin A. Bell, G-20 Asks OECD to Review Rules With Goal of Curbing profit Shifting, DAILY 
TAX REP., Dec. 11, 2012, at I-1, available at Bloomberg BNA No.237.  
4 See Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264192744-en. This initial statement was followed 
in July 2013 with an OECD “Action Plan” for addressing the so-called homeless income or base 
erosion/profit shifting problem over an approximate two-year period.  See Action Plan on Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (2013), http://www.keepee 
k.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/action-plan-on-base-erosion-and-profit-shifting_978926420 
2719-en. 
5 See U.S. Reform Efforts Must be Informed by International Base Erosion Fight, DAILY TAX REP., 
Dec. 11, 2012, at G-3, available at Bloomberg BNA No. 237 
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nothing new about such declarations, which have occurred repeatedly over the past fifty 
years.6 
These comments largely relate to the concerns of the thirty-four OECD member 
countries. Non-governmental organizations and other interest groups working on behalf 
of emerging or developing nations are also concerned about this issue, fearing that global 
tax planning strips income from such countries. 
At the same time, there has been controversy between non-OECD member 
countries concerning the defense of their own tax bases.  This has occurred in the form of 
domestic tax policies of the so-called BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa, as well as other “source” countries).  These countries have also objected 
with increasingly strident voices to the negative impact of the OECD/UN model income 
tax treaties on the economic health of their countries.7  
These many voices chant a similar refrain of lament attributing economic malaise 
at the doorstep of MNEs.  A reasonable observer, not sophisticated in global taxation 
matters, listening to this chorus would likely ask a series of questions seeking to get her 
bearings for a discussion of the issues.  The first would be whether the press declarations 
are accurate as a matter of fact.  The answer would likely be in the affirmative, in the 
sense that MNEs seek to move income from places where it could be deemed to have 
been earned, to a place where it would be taxed at a lower rate.  It would likely be 
explained that tax is an expense like any other and business organizations must minimize 
their costs to remain competitive. 
This answer would lead to the second question: are such MNE global tax 
strategies unlawful?  The response would likely be that such policies are consistent with 
the international tax agreements throughout the twentieth century.  Indeed, all countries 
have active tax enforcement mechanisms which routinely examine the affairs of even 
small and medium-size MNEs.8 
Our thoughtful observer would then be confused, asking: “Hold on, I must be 
missing something.  How can it be that these companies are so publicly criticized if they 
follow the law and are held to account in the very countries voicing the criticisms?”  The 
respondent would likely answer with a shrug of shoulders and blank expression, 
ultimately advising “that is a good question.” 
Indeed, the “what’s missing” element of the current debate is a fundamental 
matter that seems to be entirely lost in what is becoming a public crescendo of criticism 
pillorying MNEs and their tax planning arrangements as the bad guys in times of 
economic malaise.  It is a drama that seems to grow in volume and intensity. 
The purpose of this article is to provide explanation for the “what’s missing” 
question.  As will be set out in detail below, the tension reflected in the current public 
dialogue is ultimately attributable to outdated treaty policy.  Our model income tax 
treaties (both OECD and UN) were designed to minimize income that would be allocated 
                                                 
6 See Richard M. Hammer, Cym H. Lowell, Marc M. Levey, INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING: 
OECD GUIDELINES at ¶ 2.06[2] (2012) (describing the OECD so-called “Harmful Tax Competition” project) 
[hereinafter OECD TRANSFER PRICING]. 
7 See OECD TRANSFER PRICING, supra note 6, at ¶ 12.01[5][a].  
8 Local tax authority enforcement is facilitated by cross-border income allocation documentation 
requirements in at least seventy countries.  See OECD TRANSFER PRICING, supra note 6, at ¶ 10.05 and ch. 14 
(discussing the requirements in each country). 
2013] INCOME TAX TREATY POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY: 5 
RESIDENCE VS. SOURCE 
to source countries, with the residue allocated to residence countries.  This process 
occurred in the 1920s, immediately following World War I.  
Needless to say, the world has changed in the interim, in politics, business 
practices, and in every other imaginable manner.  The actual terms used to describe the 
respective countries in the debates of the 1920s are emblematic of the distance between 
then and now.  The dialectic was framed in terms of the allocation of income (tax 
jurisdiction) between Imperial and Colony countries (meaning, respectively, England and 
India at the time).  To a large extent, there has even been a reversal of roles in the 
intervening period of almost one hundred years.  The Imperial countries (residence 
countries in treaty terms) have become Colonies (source countries in the same terms).  
Treaty policies intended to allocate income to the framers of the treaties actually now 
allocate income to other countries.  
In other words, “what’s missing” is that: (i) no country seems to like the treaty 
rules which guide the allocation of income between countries; (ii) there is no movement 
to update those rules to reflect the economy of the twenty-first century as opposed to that 
of the early twentieth century; and (iii) MNEs have become the villains for these failures.  
Accordingly, it is time to update the underlying treaty policy in a manner that 
will be accepted by all parties singing the current song of lament.  At the end of the day, 
MNEs will abide by the rules that are established.  In all likelihood, the principal request 
of MNEs would be for any evolution of such income allocation rules to be undertaken in 
a neutral manner so that all competitors are treated consistently.  This work cannot be 
limited to a few decision-makers, as was the case in the 1920s when the current rules 
were developed.  That group was composed of the victors of World War I who were also 
capital exporting countries, a small fraternity. 
In this article, we begin by restating the foundational premise of our existing 
treaty and transfer pricing policies (Part I).  We then examine the economic context of the 
immediate post-World War I world of the 1920s which spawned the policy premise (Part 
II), followed by evolution of the framework to address the needs of the policy-makers of 
that era (Parts III through VII).  As the policy implementation occurred, it soon became 
apparent that there was a serious problem in the foundational premise (Parts IX and X).  
The flaw could have been addressed by an even earlier proposal, which continues to be a 
live international tax policy issue today.  Finally, we suggest how the flawed foundational 
premise could be addressed to meet the needs of both countries and MNEs today (Part 
XII). 
I. EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL TENSION CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL 
TAXATION 
The creation of global tax treaties was a critical international taxation evolution 
in the twentieth century.  It will almost certainly be a center stage issue in the economic 
world of the twenty-first century. For the reasons noted above, the current model treaties 
of the OECD and the UN are based on the concept that residual income9 for global 
income tax purposes should be allocated to the country of residence (“residence country”) 
of a MNE, and not to the country of the source of the underlying economic activity 
(“source country”).  The allocation of income between residence and source countries is 
                                                 
9 For the purposes of this article, the term “residual income” refers to the portion of income earned 
by all parties to cross-border transactions (“combined income”) that remains after a routine return has been 
allocated to each of the related parties for the functions and risks that it performs (“residual income”).  This is 
a concept that is rarely defined beyond certain TP contexts. 
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accomplished via the associated enterprise and related articles of the model treaties, 
commonly referred to as transfer pricing (“TP”), which principles have evolved over 
many years within this conceptual framework. 
The origins of our existing treaty models are commonly traced to the work of the 
League of Nations (the “League of Nations”), which commenced in 1923, shortly 
following the cessation of hostilities in World War I. 10   An earlier model had been 
developed by the International Chamber of Commerce (the “ICC”) beginning in 1920.  
The ICC model reflected a different approach, which would have utilized a profit-split 
methodology for such allocation.  In what now can be called a colossal mistake,11 the ICC 
model was, beginning in 1923, rejected by the League of Nations in favor of the 
residence concept that became the base for the extant OECD and UN model treaties.  
The allocation of taxation rights to residual income12 has become a compelling 
treaty policy issue in the twenty-first century as tax base competition has arisen between: 
(i) source and residence countries; and (ii) tax authorities in every country and MNEs, as 
noted above.  In addition, developing and emerging countries are in need of both tax 
revenue for economic growth, and defense of their own tax bases.  International finance 
and non-governmental organizations have their own interests in facilitating growth in 
these countries.  Finally, MNEs are the stakeholders in this process, often pilloried for 
their effective tax rate policies.  The resulting tension surrounding the source country vs. 
residence country issue is ripe for global resolution. 
As this process evolves, the ICC model may provide an interesting frame of 
comparative reference for the existing treaty models.  Interestingly, the pre-League of 
Nations history has not been widely studied by scholars. 
A. Foundational Premise of Our Treaty Networks 
The primacy of residence in treaty policy has persisted through the global 
economic evolution of the post-World War II and Cold War eras.  The consequence of 
this has been that residual income has typically been allocated to residence countries, 
while source countries have been left to collect withholding taxes on certain categories of 
income and assess net basis taxation only when an MNE’s activities created a permanent 
establishment in that country.  
As the economies of the BRICS and other Source Countries matured in the late 
twentieth century, resistance to the subordination of source to residence as the means of 
allocating residual income has been reflected in the evolution of their domestic tax 
policies.13  There have also been official statements rejecting the OECD TP principles 
and declaring the potential need for development of a new model treaty reflecting Source 
Country considerations.  The resultant specter of double or multiple taxation to MNEs, 
and consequent need for relief via the mutual agreement procedures of bilateral treaties or 
                                                 
10 A discussion of the League of Nations model treaty and the development of the arm’s length 
standard is beyond the scope of this paper.  For a thorough discussion of the genesis of these foundational 
premises to modern international tax law along with the substantial mischief that the adherence to these 
principles creates, see Bret Wells & Cym Lowell, Tax Base Erosion and Homeless Income: Collection at 
Source is the Linchpin, 65 TAX L. REV. 535 (2012).  
11 As will be seen below, it was a colossal mistake because the League of Nations assumed that all 
countries would adopt the same tax policies and rates.  See Parts XI and XII. 
12 See supra note 8. 
13 See OECD TRANSFER PRICING, supra note 6, at ¶¶ 2.06[4][a], 2.06[4][c], 12.01[5]. 
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domestic foreign tax credit mechanisms, has given rise to tax base defense concerns of 
both MNEs and their residence countries.14 
As will be developed below,15 the League of Nations model was constructed 
from distinct policy judgments: (i) source country should tax local operations; (ii) 
residual income should be earned by the residence country; (iii) the presence of an 
interim holding company in a country should cause that country to be treated as a 
residence country; (iv) subsidiaries, by themselves, should not be treated as permanent 
establishments of the offshore parent company; and (v) TP is to be applied on a separate 
account basis (collectively, the “foundational premise”).  As a consequence of these 
elements, the effective tax rate planning paradigm of MNEs has been to utilize the 
existing treaty and TP policies to earn a material portion of their combined income in 
low- or no-tax jurisdictions.16  Taxation is a cost of doing business and, like all other 
costs, it is a critical element of competition in all industries that must be managed and 
controlled.  What was envisioned as an allocation of taxing rights in favor of residence 
countries has resulted in the creation of “homeless income” (income that is not 
effectively taxed in either the source country or the ultimate residence country via full 
domestic net basis taxation).17  The resultant perceived tax base erosion in both residence 
and source countries has been addressed by an ever-spreading range of domestic tax 
regimes (controlled foreign corporation, foreign tax credit, earnings stripping, and so on), 
as well as anti-avoidance principles, annual TP documentation requirements, aggressive 
examination techniques, and severe penalty policies.18 
B. Homeless Income 
While the foundational premise resulted in allocation of the primary right to tax 
residual income to residence countries, it also, ironically enough, spawned the 
phenomenon of homeless income.  The irony is further heightened in the current period 
as these same residence countries have largely abandoned worldwide taxation of MNE 
activities.19  This frames an interesting irony: the residence countries that established the 
foundational premise have largely eschewed taxation of extra-territorial income.  The 
                                                 
14 See OECD TRANSFER PRICING, supra note 6, at ¶ 12.04.  
15 See infra Parts III – VIII. 
16 See Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on 
Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov'tal Affairs, 112th Cong.  (2012).  The global 
popular and financial press have also traced these debates.  See, e.g., Charles Duhigg & David Kocieniewski, 
How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2012, at A1; John D. McKinnon & Scott Thurm, 
U.S. Firms Move Abroad to Cut Taxes: Despite ’04 Law, Companies Reincorporate Overseas, Saving Big 
Sums on Taxes, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 28, 2012) available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444230504577615232602107536.html. 
17 See Wells & Lowell, Homeless Income and Tax Base Erosion, supra note 10, at 537–38.  See 
also Edward D. Kleinbard,  Stateless Income’s Challenge to Tax Policy, TAX NOTES INT’L, Oct. 29, 2012, at 
499. 
18 A summary of the TP principles in each of more than 70 countries is collected in OECD 
TRANSFER PRICING, supra note 6, at ch. 14.  
19 The United States is now the last large major industrial country to not have a territorial tax 
regime.  See Price Waterhouse Coopers, PWC Reviews U.K. Finance Bill Provisions on Foreign Profit 
Repatriation, 2009, available at  Tax Doc. 2009-10308, 2009 WTD 87-22; see also Tom Neubig & Barbara 
M. Angus, Japan’s Move to Territorial Contrasts with U.S. Tax Policy, 54 TAX NOTES INT’L  252, 252 (2009) 
(pointing out that the U.S. is becoming increasingly isolated).  Others scholars have forcefully made the case 
that the United States’ adherence to a worldwide tax regime, when all of its other major trading partners 
utilize a territorial tax regime, puts the United States out-of-step with the global economy and creates a 
significant competitive handicap.  See Michael S. Knoll, The Corporate Income Tax and the Competitiveness 
of US Industries, 63 Tax L. Rev. 771, 771–72, 787–88, 793 (2010). 
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result is a windfall: income that is taxed nowhere by nobody.  Our treaties were premised 
on the concept of allocating income to prevent double taxation, but the result is that they 
have achieved double non-taxation.  The absurdity of the result should be the benchmark 
of the flaws in the existing treaty paradigm. 
In other words, homeless income is a consequence of the foundational premise.  
Residence countries sought to extract residual income from source countries in the 
economic world of the 1920s.  They also had a vision of common tax regimes in all 
countries.  This did not occur, facilitating the evolution of interim holding companies in 
low tax countries.  To top it off, the former residence countries have largely abandoned 
the taxation of extra-territorial income for their own tax base defense reasons, as they 
have become source countries themselves. 
As noted in the introduction above, tension in the world of international taxation 
has grown.  MNEs are routinely attacked for aggressive and effective tax rate planning 
techniques.  The response of the MNE community has been, appropriately, that “we 
follow the rules that have been developed by public and private deliberations over a long 
period of time.  If those policies are deemed to no longer articulate appropriate inter-
governmental policies, then the time has come to develop new policies.  We will be 
delighted to be active participants in this process.  Our request is that common principles 
be applied to all competitors in the global economy.”20   
The essential issue is that source countries, as well as residence countries that no 
longer seek to tax extra-territorial income, increasingly insist on taxing income based on 
the source of the underlying economic activity, not on the residence of the parent 
company (or interim holding company).  There are at least three explanations for the 
current reality, which will be developed further through much this article: 
1. Post-World War I Politics: The imposition of residence as an 
allocation criteria was largely a product of post-World War I 
international politics.  The world has changed dramatically in the interim.  
Former “colony” countries are now economic powerhouses; 
2. Interim Holding Companies: The residence concept had, from its
 inception, a serious flaw.  It did not take into account interim 
holding companies in low tax jurisdictions; and 
3. One-Sided Transfer Pricing: TP principles evolved on a one-
sided basis –i.e., testing, typically, the “routine side” of transactional 
flows on the source country side, so that residual income would flow to 
the other side (the residence country side).21 
                                                 
20 In this regard, it is appropriate to note that in the proceedings of the U.S. Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations hearings on Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code in September 
2012, there was roundhouse criticism of several prominent U.S. MNEs and their effective tax rate planning 
strategies.  The MNEs had provided detailed information prior to the hearings.  At the hearings, the MNE 
executives were candid.  In essence, they advised that: (i) their tax strategies were designed to comply with 
existing global laws and regulations; (ii) meet competitive considerations relating to tax as a cost (i.e., a MNE 
cannot compete against a competitor with a materially lower effective tax rate, as tax is typically one of, or 
the highest, expense of companies); and (iii) openness to participate in a global process to develop new 
principles that will apply to themselves and their competitors.  Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax 
Code, supra note 16. 
21 In this context, “one-sided” TP methodologies test the financial results of related party 
transactions by focusing on one party to the transactions and the financial results of that party, as opposed to 
a “two-sided” analysis that would focus on both or all parties to the transaction and their combined income 
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As a result of these factors, many MNEs experience the following attitude of tax 
authorities in Source Countries: “If you want to do business in my country, you will pay 
tax on my terms; if you do not like my terms, do not come to my country; others will take 
your place.” 
 C. Development of a Current Treaty Model 
The political and economic tension surrounding international taxation principles 
in the early twenty-first century is ripe for resolution.  Just as the world needed to prepare 
for new realities following World War I, today there is genuine need to reexamine tax 
policy determinations to assure that there is reasonable balance to achieve the 
international economic and taxation goals of the world for the current millennium.  
The issues that will need to be addressed in such a process are appropriately 
framed by the positions of the groups that play important roles in the current international 
taxation world.   
There are at least six groups with distinct voices: 
1. OECD: traditionally composed of developed countries, which 
sponsors the Model Tax Treaty and Commentary, together with Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, that are the standard of the world.  
2. UN: often assisting developing or emerging countries, which has 
just issued its own transfer pricing manual intending to consistently 
apply the OECD Guidelines for the benefit of developing/emerging 
countries (i.e., source countries).22 
3. World Bank, Non-Governmental Organizations (“NGOs”), and 
Related Group: often speaking on behalf of emerging countries and their 
need for tax revenue to continue development. 
4. ICC: composed of both residence and source countries, which 
undertook the initial modern treaty formulation process in 1920. 
5. BRICS and Developed Source Countries: not happy with 
principles of either OECD or UN, and certainly no longer emerging 
countries. 
6. MNEs: are stakeholders.  Their fiduciary responsibility to 
shareholders and investors, as well as their duty to residence and source 
countries, is to conduct business, including payment of tax, in 
accordance with internationally agreed upon rules and norms of conduct 
as implemented in the respective countries in which they conduct 
business.  They must also responsibly address the reality that tax is a 
major cost and competitors often enjoy comparative advantage in 
applicable taxation regime.  
In this article, we trace the evolution of the current model income tax treaty 
framework from its origins in 1920.  Much of the actual history has been buried in the 
archives of the ICC and League of Nations.  When the debates of the 1920s are viewed 
from the vantage point of the early twenty-first century economic world, and the 
                                                                                                                                     
relating to such transactions.  The significance of these methodologies is developed in Part II.A infra, via an 
illustration. 
22 See UNITED NATIONS, PRACTICAL MANUAL ON TRANSFER PRICING FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
(2012). 
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disparate voices of residence and source countries, we draw two conclusions.  First, the 
issues debated in the 1920s remain vital today.  Second, those issues are in desperate 
need of being revisited and reformulated to restore balance for the future.  Today there is 
far more controversy surrounding international taxation and TP than is necessary to 
assure reasonable allocation of taxing jurisdiction among all countries to facilitate global 
job creation and economic growth. 
As is often the case, study of the historic evolution of our international tax treaty 
principles may provide illumination for the future, including answering the “what’s 
missing” question noted in the introduction. 
II. MERCANTILIST PARADIGM IN THE POST-WORLD WAR I PERIOD 
When we examine the origins of current tax treaty policy, we need to imagine the 
world as it was in the 1920s.  The paradigm of commerce and international taxation was a 
company resident in a residence country (let’s call it “ImperialCo”) with an affiliate in an 
under-developed source country that was a colony of the residence country 
(“ColonyCo”).  A global war just ended, with the residence country having enormous 
debt.  There was a material flow of commerce between the ImperialCo and ColonyCo.  
For the most part, the former transferred to the latter capital, technology, and access to 
global markets.  ColonyCo responded by producing commodities and goods for 
ImperialCo and its global markets.  The residence country was a creditor and the source 
country a debtor. 
More specifically, the situation could be described as follows:23  
ImperialCo is incorporated and has its home office in England. The year 
is 1925.  ImperialCo is in the textile business requiring a ready supply of 
cotton, a raw material not grown in England.  ImperialCo has a global 
organizational structure with subsidiaries based within the cotton-
producing British Commonwealth countries such as India.  It also has 
manufacturing facilities in important commercial regions of the world 
(India and elsewhere), as well as shipping companies that transport raw 
materials and finished products to global commercial markets.  All these 
operations are based in the colonies, with affiliates conducting business 
using capital and technology provided by ImperialCo.  In return, the 
affiliates pay interest and royalties to ImperialCo, which are deducted for 
colony income tax purposes.  To the extent that excess cash remains in 
colony affiliates after local expenses and taxes, such income is 
distributed to ImperialCo via dividends. 
The policy issue for consideration was how income from these activities 
(functions and risks) should be shared between ImperialCo and ColonyCo or, in today’s 
terms, the residence and source countries. As will be developed below, the framework of 
taxation that evolved in the 1920s was based on the mercantilist belief that imperial 
countries were the source of capital and know-how while the colonies were passive 
suppliers of goods or services with little value added functionality.  As a result, the right 
to tax residual income belonged to the residence countries of the imperial companies 
(England in this example).  Source countries (India in the example) were allowed to tax 
                                                 
23 The following hypothetical is adapted from Mitchell B. Carroll, Allocation of Business Income: 
The Draft Convention of the League of Nations, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1934) (giving example of cotton and 
other goods produced in India to be sold abroad). 
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only routine profits deemed earned therein and impose withholding taxes on certain types 
of outbound payments. 
The tax planning strategies of ImperialCo utilized in this mercantilist paradigm 
would likely be along the following lines: 
Raw materials (raw cotton) or processed goods would be purchased from 
the colony country company (“IndiaCo”) at the lowest price possible 
consistent with providing IndiaCo the capital needed to continue 
operations (“supply chain transactions”). 
Movable tangible property (machinery and equipment) could be leased 
by ImperialCo, with leasehold payments made by IndiaCo (“lease 
transfer payments”). 
Capital could be provided via loans from ImperialCo, with interest 
payments made by IndiaCo (“interest transfer payments”). 
Know-how to the extent required could be provided in the form of 
licenses with royalties paid by IndiaCo (“royalty transfer payments”). 
Services provided by ImperialCo would be paid for via service fees 
(“service transactions”). 
The net result of these transactions was that ImperialCo would have the ability to 
transfer the residual Indian profits out of India at a minimal Indian tax cost, leaving only 
routine operating profits in IndiaCo.  These arrangements can be depicted as follows: 
Mercantilist Paradigm Example 
 
A. Application of Foundational Premise 
Much of what can be drawn from the following study of the origins of our 
current model treaties concerns the evolution of the elements of the foundational premise.  
Before undertaking that discussion, it is appropriate to frame the mercantilist paradigm in 
a manner to reflect the current structure and TP policies of many MNEs which, in turn, 
produces much of the tension in our international taxation world. 
For this purpose, assume that ImperialCo has formed an interim holding 
company (“HoldCo”) in a country having a broad treaty network and low domestic 
income tax rates (let’s call it “Holdingland”).  The “residual profits” (“residual 
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income”)24 noted above are earned by HoldCo.  Assume further that ColonyCo has net 
sales of 1,000X and incurs costs of 100x in conducting its operations in India, excluding 
any lease, interest, royalty, or service fees (the “related party payments”) paid to related 
parties (HoldCo for purposes of discussion).  For Indian TP purposes, it is determined 
that the appropriate TP method to test the margin of ColonyCo is the cost plus method, 
and that the arm’s length “plus” is 5%; this is a one-sided transfer pricing method in the 
sense that the testing is limited to the income that should be received by ColonyCo for TP 
purposes.25  
This would mean that the financial results of ColonyCo’s activities prior to 
consideration of the residual income (ultimately allocated to HoldCo) would be as 
follows: 
ILLUSTRATION A 
     
 ColonyCo 
  Net sales   1,000 
  Operating expenses         –  100 
  Net income         900 
Under the TP method, ColonyCo is entitled to earn 5% on its operating expenses, 
which would mean that its share of the net income would be 5.  The balance of the net 
income (900 – 5 = 895) would be allocated to HoldCo and paid via the Related Party 
Payments.26  The allocation of income between the parties would be as indicated in 
Illustration B: 
ILLUSTRATION B 
(1)      (2)        (3) 
 ColonyCo HoldCo       Combined27 
 Gross Income 1,000 895 1,000 
 Operating expenses  –  100  0 –  100 
 Related party payments  –  895  0 0 
 Net income  5 895 900 
As noted in Part I.A, above, the foundational premise had several elements. In 
the context of the Illustration B, these elements are as follows: 
(i) Source country should tax local operations: this is reflected in 
Column (1) above; 
                                                 
24 See supra note 8. 
25 The cost plus method is a one-sided transfer pricing method test, meaning that the arm’s length 
return of ColonyCo is determined by testing its functions by margins earned by uncontrolled companies 
performing similar functional activities, which is easily obtained from data bases of public companies.  See 
OECD TRANSFER PRICING, supra note 6, at ¶ 4.04.  Such methods are the means by which most TP is 
typically undertaken, especially for documentation purposes in the 70+ countries that require such 
documentation. 
26 For purposes of this illustration, we are ignoring how the related party payments would be 
characterized under the India – Holdingland treaty, which could have other consequences, such as Indian 
withholding taxes.  We are also ignoring all other taxation matters, such as consumption tax or application of 
outbound payment limitations under India law. 
27 The combined income is an aggregate of the separate income of ColonyCo and HoldCo.  See 
supra note 8.  For such purposes, the related party payments are ignored. 
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(ii) Residual income should be earned by the residence country: this 
is reflected in Column (2) above;28  
(iii) Presence of an interim holding company should be treated as a 
residence country: this is also reflected in Column (2) in the sense that 
HoldCo is entitled to receive the residual income); 
(iv) Subsidiaries should not be treated as permanent establishments: 
achieved by the segregation of Column (1) from Column (2) for 
Indian tax purposes; and 
(v) TP is to be applied on a separate account basis: achieved by 
acceptance by the source country (India) of the results of elements (i) – 
(iv) 
The results in Illustrations A and B reflect a disconnect between the allocation of 
income and economic reality.  Residual income arising from economic activities in 
source countries like India is allocated away from them.  If the resident country were to 
tax such income, then this misallocation would not create double non-taxation, but 
resident countries are increasingly unlikely to tax extra-territorial income.  The TP 
policies developed in the mercantile era thus achieve results in today’s reality that were 
probably not anticipated.  As will be developed in the proceeding pages, source countries 
are in the process of seeking a solution to this state of affairs.  A review of the past and 
the decision points that have led to the current situation in international tax policy 
provides guidance for a way forward. 
III. BIRTH OF TWENTIETH CENTURY MODEL TAX TREATY POLICY 
World War I ended in November 1918.  In that world, all countries had crushing 
debt burdens and sought to impose taxes wherever possible.  The danger of double or 
multiple taxation was a significant concern of businesses and governments. 
The ICC was formed in Paris in 1919 to promote trade and investment, open 
markets for goods and services, and facilitate the free flow of capital.29  One of the 
foundational elements of the ICC was the elimination of double taxation as indicated in 
the following early resolution: 
RESOLVED, That the International Chamber of Commerce, in meeting 
duly assembled, composed of representatives of commercial and 
industrial organizations of the allied countries [victors of World War I], 
                                                 
28 For this purpose, residual income is the share of combined income (Column (1) + (Column (2)) 
remaining after allocating to the TP tested party (ColonyCo in this illustration) its income applying an 
appropriate one-sided TP method (Column(1) using the cost plus method).  One potential view of residual 
income is that it must be attributable to something.  But what is it?  Perhaps its existence testifies to the 
failure of accounting concepts to reflect economic reality.  In this view, if we knew better what the something 
was we could design accounting policies to accurately reflect its allocation and where it should be taxed.  In 
our own view, the something is simply the obvious flaws in the Foundational Premise and current model 
treaties and their implementing TP policy.   
29 See The merchant of peace, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF 
COMMERCE,http://www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/history/  (founded by a “group of industrialists, financiers and 
traders . . . determined to bring economic prosperity to a world that was still reeling from the devastation of 
World War I.  They founded the International Chamber of Commerce and called themselves ‘the merchants 
of peace’.  The world had few working international structures in the immediate aftermath of the first of the 
20th century's global conflicts.  There was no world system of rules to govern trade, investment, finance or 
commercial relations. That the private sector should start filling the gap without waiting for governments was 
ground-breaking.  It was an idea that took hold.”) (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).  
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urge prompt agreement between the Governments of the allied countries 
in order to avoid that individuals or companies of any one country may 
be liable to more than one tax on the same income, taking into 
consideration that the country to which . . . such company belongs has 
right to claim the difference between the tax paid and the home tax.30 
The ICC focused on the double taxation issue as the League of Nations organized 
its own efforts.31 The ICC’s initial assembly was held in Paris in June 1920,32 which 
adopted a resolution that “Governments of the allied countries should speedily come to 
international agreements, in order to prevent . . . companies from being compelled to pay 
tax on the same income in more than one country.”33  The first ICC Congress was held in 
London on June 27 to July 1, 1921.34  Double taxation was one of the first subjects 
addressed by the ICC.35  The ICC considered a set of principles that were debated and 
ultimately revised.36 
                                                 
30 International Chamber of Commerce, Congress of London 1921, brochure 11, at 3 (Brochures 1–
16, available from ICC Paris Archives) [hereinafter 1921 ICC Proceedings],.  See generally Michael J. 
Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The ‘Original Intent’ of US International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1066–
74 (1997) (addressing the original ICC work as an element of the need for reform of the U.S. international 
taxation system).     
31 There was contact between the ICC and the League, including overlapping membership in the 
double taxation committees.  See International Chamber of Commerce, Double Taxation (Survey of the Work 
of the I.C.C. Since the Rome Congress), brochure 34, at 10 (describing the Brussels Third Congress, June 21–
27, 1925) [hereinafter 1925 ICC Proceedings]. 
32 See Business Men Go Abroad, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1920. 
33 International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Second Congress Rome, brochure 25, at 14 (Mar. 18–
25, 1923) [hereinafter 1923 ICC Proceedings]. 
34 The proceedings are documented in the 1921 ICC Proceedings brochures.  Contemporaneous 
news accounts explained the significance of the meetings.  See Favor World Board to Facilitate Trade, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 20, 1921 (attendees to create “a permanent International Committee charged with ironing our 
difficulties arising in the exchange of goods between nationals of different countries . . . .”). 
35 1921 ICC Proceedings, supra note 30, brochure 11 (Part I), at 3.  The Committee was composed 
of delegates from Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Netherlands and the United States (John B. Robinson 
of Coudert Brothers, Paris, and Robert Grant, Jr., Lee Higginson & Co.).  Id. 
36 1921 ICC Proceedings, supra note 30, brochure 11 (Part I), at 5.  (The originally proposed 
principles were edited, with deletions crossed-through and added language underlined) as follows: 
1st Principle. 
As With regards to the taxation ofn income gained in earned and collected within the 
country, from whatever its derived (real estate, personal or property, business and 
professionals), each nation should applywithout prejudice to the question of super-tax36 (impôt 
global) on income, each country should accord similar treatment to all its tax-payers, whether 
nationals or both citizens and foreigners, whether resident or non-resident in the country or 
not. 
2nd Principle. 
As With regards to the taxation on incomes earned and collected abroad, from whatever 
its derived . . . , apart from the question of a total tax on the without prejudice to the super-tax 
(impôt global) on income, each nation country should applyaccord similar treatment to all tax-
payers subject to this tax (i.e. nationalscitizens or foreigners livingresident in the country, 
nationals living and citizens resident abroad); if this class of income, if total exoneration is not 
possible, cannot be entirely free from liability to taxation, it should be allowed a big reduction, 
given the fact that it has already been taxed in the country of origin the object of a 
considerable rebate in consideration of the tax on such income already levied in the country of 
origin:  
Tthise principle is already followed in force in certain countries (for example, in Belgium, for 
example, where total relief comes to as much as the rebate amounts to 80%, and in the United 
States, where the total reliefrebate is granted total in cases of reciprocal treatment). 
. . . . 
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In the proceedings,37 the U.S. representative (W.F. Gephart) expressed concern 
about the first principle (place of collection of tax) since “this can be fixed or determined 
at the desire or option of the taxpayer . . . Liability to taxation should not depend upon a 
characteristic so subject to manipulation.”38  A British representative (Sir Algernon Firth) 
urged that “tax should be levied where the income is earned . . . .”39  At the end of the 
discussion, it was agreed that the focus was to achieve “no double taxation.”40  There was 
also agreement that a Committee on Double Taxation would be assembled, and Professor 
Thomas Sewall Adams from the United States was selected to serve on this committee 
for the United States.41 
The Second Congress was held in Rome in 1923.42 The proceedings noted that 
additional meetings had been held in the interim, including contacts with the financial 
Commission of the League of Nations.43 
In these early discussions, the bedrock principle was that where a company does 
business in more than one country:  
1. The profits should be taxed in each country in proportion to the 
profit realized therein (paragraph 8 of the ICC draft 1923 resolution);44  
2. If the countries cannot agree, then the allocation would be 
presumed to be proportional to sales (turn-over) (paragraph 9 of the ICC 
draft 1923 resolution);45 provided that  
3. In no case should such proportions exceed the total fixed by the 
“competent authority in the country of domicile” (residence) (paragraph 
10 of the ICC draft 1923 resolution).46  In other words, the ICC 
                                                                                                                                     
3rd Principle. 
As With regards total income tax on all categoriesto the super-tax (impôt global) on 
income of every class . . . it is desirable that each nation country should only levy one tax only 
foreigners living within its territory, which should only apply to the total income actually 
earned in the country, excluding income earned in other countries its own citizens without 
regard to their place of Residence. 
In cases where certain countries cannot adopt the solution they should at least refrain from 
taxing foreigners resident within their frontiers except by tax applicable solely to the total 
income earned in the country itself apart from income earned in other countries. 
4th Principle. 
It is advisable desirable to see the above mentioned principles given above applied to 
both individuals and corporate bodies companies, etc., in the same manner as individuals. 
. . . . 
The principles were then explored in terms of the laws of each of the participating countries. 
37 The US representatives in the proceedings were Willis H. Booth, John H. Fahey, Edward A. 
Filene, William Butterworth, Harry Wheeler, and Owen D, Young. 
38 1921 ICC Proceedings, supra note 30, brochure 18 (Part I), at 58. 
39 Id. at 61. 
40 Id. at 62. 
41 1921 ICC Proceedings, supra note 30, brochure 19 (Part I), at 13.  Other members were Sir 
Algernon F. Firth (Great Britain), Mr. O.E. Bodington (Great Britain), Dr. J. Ph. Suyling (Netherlands), Dr. 
J.E. Claringbould (Netherlands), Robert Grant, Jr. (United States), W.F. Gephart (United States), and Jerome 
Green (United States).  The role of Adams is discussed extensively in Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 30, at 
1027–33. 
42 The US representatives were, as noted above, appointed in 1921, as well as J.B. Robinson, a 
barrister, who had been active in 1921 as well. 
43 1923 ICC Proceedings, supra note 33, brochure 25, at 16. 
44 See 1923 ICC Proceedings, supra note 33, brochure 23, at 34–35. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
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recognized that the combined income of the enterprise would need to be 
allocated, ultimately on the basis of proportional sales if the countries 
could not otherwise agree, and subject to agreement by the country of 
residence (domicile). 
The above proposed profit-split (or formulary apportionment) approach starts 
with the basic idea that both countries, the residence country and the source country, have 
a co-existent interest in the combined income.  Instead of assigning all rights over that 
income to one country or another, the above framework sought to ensure that an 
allocation would be agreed by both countries.  They would have flexibility to vary the 
profit-split methodology, subject to a default formulary apportionment rule in the event 
that agreement could not be reached.  The premises behind this ICC proposal were that: 
(i) the MNE was simply a stakeholder and should not bear double taxation; and (ii) 
residual income should be allocated between the countries on a proportional basis.  
In the discussions leading to the ICC proposal, it was recognized the existence of 
separate fiscal regimes in each country was a fundamental problem.47  While the problem 
of allocation of taxing jurisdiction could be resolved by the introduction of uniform fiscal 
legislation among all countries, this was renounced as “utopian.”48  The only practical 
response to the double taxation risk in the context of the sovereignty of each country was 
to provide a framework that sought to assure that income should only be taxed once.  The 
issue, then, was to determine “what constitutes the right of one country to tax the income 
of a taxpayer in preference to any other country.”49  The following statement at the time 
framed the issue well: 
It does not seem probable that there would be serious difference of opinion on 
this matter. A wide-spread view considers that the country from whose territories the 
income is derived should in every case have the right to levy a tax thereon.  At the same 
time it is agreed that as regards income derived elsewhere, the country of domicile should 
have the privileged position.50  
The ICC delegates contemplated that if a profit-split methodology were accepted 
by countries under the auspices of the League of Nations, the principles would be more 
likely to be readily accepted by the member nations in their national laws of the 
countries.51  In addition, it was hoped that a set of regulations would be developed by an 
“international fiscal commission” along with an administrative appeal process in the 
country or as an international commission with national court or international court or 
arbitration review ultimately available.52 
The proceedings noted that guidance had been obtained from a variety of 
sources, including the Rome Convention between the Succession States to the Austro-
Hungarian Empire in 1921 (the “1921 Austro-Hungarian Treaty”),53 though uncertainty 
                                                 
47 The same is true today as countries attempt to protect their tax base and attack the homeless 
income problem with ad hoc domestic responses. 
48 See 1923 ICC Proceedings, supra note 33, brochure 25, at 8. 
49 Id. 
50 See 1923 ICC Proceedings, supra note 33, brochure 25, at 8.  As indicated from the above 
excerpt, the ICC contemplated that a system of credits be established between countries except that no 
country would be expected to give up via foreign tax credit relief more than "half the amount that it could 
have gained had the income been derived from its own territory."  Id. at 9. 
51 Id. at 11. 
52 Id. at 12–13. 
53 Id. at 16, 19, 49–52 (including the text of the treaty).   
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as to the definition of critical terms (such as “domicile”) would need to be addressed.  It 
was recognized that: 
The necessity for regulating double taxation by means of international 
conventions becomes more and more apparent, as different countries 
replace their taxes on real estate by personal taxes on income and 
fortune.54 
In the 1923 discussions, there was a preference for providing that “only income 
acquired in the country should be affected [subjected to tax by such country],” though 
there was recognition that national regimes would differ and perhaps a rebate system 
would be appropriate (such as the foreign tax credit system recently adopted in the United 
States).55  Interestingly, the proceedings included a copy of the 1921 Austro-Hungarian 
Treaty, which explicitly provided for: (i) taxation by the residence country; and (ii) where 
there was a presence in another country, each country shall tax the portion of the income 
produced in its borders.56 
The final element of the Second 1923 Congress was a request from the United 
States that no formal resolution be adopted, since it had, late in the day, submitted 
reservations.  Accordingly, the “question of Double Taxation [was] referred for further 
study.”57   
A. Application of ICC Approach to the Mercantilist Paradigm 
If the ICC approach had been developed as the theoretical base for treaty income 
allocation, as opposed to the Foundational Premise noted in Illustration B above,58 the 
results would have been entirely different.  Instead of receiving only a cost plus 5% 
return using a one-sided TP method, the return to ColonyCo would be determined by the 
two-sided TP method testing the combined income. 
For this purpose, assume that the applicable principles are as noted above from 
the ICC proceedings59 and that India and Holdingland have agreed that the allocation of 
the combined income between ColonyCo and HoldCo should be 50:50 (based on 
pertinent factors, perhaps including “sales”).60  The results would then have been as 
indicated in Illustration C:  
                                                 
54 Id. at 19. 
55 Id. at 46. 
56 See 1921 Austro-Hungarian Treaty art. 4, in 1923 ICC Proceedings, supra note 33, brochure 25, 
at 50, which provided as follows: 
Income derived from the exercise of any kind of trade or industry is taxed by the 
State in whose territory the industrial or commercial undertaking has its registered office, even 
when the latter extends its activities into the territory of another contracting State. 
If the enterprise has its registered office in one of the contracting States, and in 
another has a branch, an agency, an establishment, a stable commercial organization, or a 
permanent representative, each one of the contracting States, shall tax that portion of the 
income produced in its own territory.  Therefore the financial authorities of the interested 
states shall be able to request the tax-payer to hand in general balance-sheets, special balance 
sheets, and all other documents required by the laws of the said States.   
57 See 1923 ICC Proceedings, supra note 33, brochure 32, at 136. 
58 Id. at Part II.A. 
59 Id. at Part III. 
60 We note that scholars have suggested approaches similar to the ICC proposal.  See, e.g., Reuven 
S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A 
proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 497 (2009). 
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ILLUSTRATION C 
  (1) (2)                     (3) 
  ColonyCo HoldCo        Combined 
 Net sales  1,000 450 1,000 
 Operating expenses   –  100     0  –  100 
 Related party payments    –  450     0        0 
 Net income     450 450 900 
Several comments are in order at this point.  The ICC proposal provided 
flexibility for countries to refine the default result set forth above.  Thus, the ICC 
approach was flexible enough to allow a functional analysis to be performed to ensure 
that the functions actually and substantively performed in the HoldCo jurisdiction did in 
fact provide the value contribution assigned to them in the apportionment methodology. 
If India and Holdingland had entered no such agreement, then ColonyCo, under 
the ICC approach, would have had to report income in India using the default mechanism 
(such as relative sales).61 
B. Continuation of the ICC Work 
Unfortunately, the promising approach originally advocated by the ICC was 
scuttled.  As the ICC work evolved, the League of Nations was getting organized.  The 
ICC was in continuing contact with the League, “which is carrying on its work [in these 
matters], but which has not yet succeeded in collecting the reports which it has entrusted 
to all known economists.”62  The approach endorsed by the League of Nations evolved 
into a different framework for handling the problem of international double taxation.   
IV. ENTRY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS63 
The Covenant of the League of Nations was signed on June 28, 1919, and entered 
into force on January 10, 1920. 64   Work on income tax treaties commenced 
immediately.65   The Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations commissioned four 
economists to study the double taxation problem.66  These economic experts faced the 
same conundrum as the ICC had: the allocation of taxing jurisdiction between countries. 
The economic experts framed the issue more specifically than had the ICC First 
and Second Congress and stated that the issue involved a conflict of interest between 
debtor (capital importing) countries and creditor (capital exporting) countries.67  Edwin 
R.A. Seligman (one of the four economists) explained the tension that faced these early 
thinkers in the following terms: 
                                                 
61 A continuing conceptual issue will remain how that 450 million, which is homeless income in the 
context of Illustration C, should be taxed.  We review a variety of perspectives on this issue in Part XII.F., 
infra. 
62 See 1923 ICC Proceedings, supra note 33, brochure 25, at 16–17.  The League’s economic 
experts were appointed in February 1921.  See 1925 ICC Proceedings, supra note 31, brochure 34, at 10. 
63 See generally Bret Wells & Cym Lowell, supra note 10. 
64 See Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), U.S.-Ger., June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43. 
65 JOHN G. HERNDON, RELIEF FROM INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION:  THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL RECIPROCITY FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOUBLE INCOME TAXATION 42 (1932). 
66 See 1923 ICC proceedings, supra note 33, brochure 25, at 16. 
67 League of Nations Econ. & Fiscal Comm., Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the 
Financial Comm., 39-41, 48-49, League of Nations Doc. E.F.S.73.F.19 (1923) [hereinafter 1923 Economic 
Experts Report]. 
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If all the states in the world were in the same relative stage of economic and 
fiscal development the situation [for reaching agreement on the means to avoid 
international  double taxation] would be far simpler.  But under the present conditions 
some countries are more or less adequately supplied with capital, while others are still in 
the earlier stages of industrial development.  The economic world today is therefore 
divided into creditor and debtor countries . . . What would be perfectly easy for a creditor 
state to adopt might be entirely unacceptable to a debtor state. 
What is true of the obvious conflicting interests in question is also seen when we 
consider the less obvious but none the less important consequences of a tax system.68 
On April 5, 1923, the economists issued their report.69  It posited that double 
taxation should be avoided by vesting the primary taxing jurisdiction in the country to 
which the taxpayer owed its “economic allegiance.”70  It identified the following four 
factors for determining economic allegiance: (1) origin of wealth, (2) situs of wealth, (3) 
place of enforcement rights to wealth, and (4) where wealth was consumed.71 
The report then analyzed four possible approaches for avoiding international 
double taxation:  
(Option 1) Country of residence would concede all taxing jurisdiction to the source state;  
(Option 2) Country of source would concede exclusive taxing jurisdiction to the 
residence state;   
 (Option 3) Proportional allocation of income between the countries of residence and 
source; or  
(Option 4) Classification of income and an assignment of the primary right to tax such 
income to the country of residence or source depending on the type of income (the so-
called “classification-and-assignment approach”).72 
The report unanimously ruled out Option 1’s approach of conceding all taxing 
jurisdiction to the source country because this violated ability-to-pay principles. 73  
Remarkably, the report expressed a preference for Option 2’s approach of exempting all 
income of a nonresident from any source country taxation and thus ceding all taxing 
jurisdiction to the country of residence. 74   But the report anticipated that this 
recommendation would be difficult to adopt because it created an enormous disadvantage 
to debtor countries,75 so the report offered as a secondary alternative the recommendation 
to classify income into various categories and then to assign taxing jurisdiction based on 
the classification (Option 4, the classification-and-assignment approach). 76   After 
discussing its rationale for which jurisdiction should have the primary right to tax each 
category of income,77 the report summarized its allocation of taxing jurisdiction for each 
category of income in the following manner: 
                                                 
68 EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, DOUBLE TAXATION AND INTERNATIONAL FISCAL COOPERATION 14–15 
(1928). 
69 1923 Economic Experts Report, supra note 67. 
70 Id. at 20–22. 
71 Id. at 22–27. 
72 Id. at 40–42. 
73 Id. at 48. 
74 Id. at 48, 51. 
75 Id. at 48–49.  In fact, developing countries in twenty subsequent years proposed their own model 
tax treaty that would repudiate Option 2 and opt for Option 1, thus advocating the exact opposite position as 
the one endorsed by the 1923 Economic Experts Report.  See Part VII, infra. 
76 Id. at 49–51. 
77 Id. at 27–38. 
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TABLE 78 
 Category of Wealth   Preponderant Element 
   Origin79 Domicile80 
  
I. Land    X  
  
II a. Mines, oil wells, etc.    X  
  




Agricultural implements, machinery,    
 flocks, and herds    X  
 
III b. Money, jewelry, furniture, etc.     X 
 
IV. Vessels    X (regist)  
  
V a. Mortgages    X (prop’y) 
   X 
(income) 
  
V b. Corporate shares     X 
  
V c. Corporate bonds     X 
  
V d. Public securities     X 
  
V e. General credits     X 
 
VI. Professional earnings     X 
 
This categorization of the right to tax income is emblematic of the economic 
relationships of the time. It essentially rests on the foundational belief that parent 
companies (ImperialCo in Mercantilist Paradigm Example in Section II) provided the 
knowledge and capital to conduct operations in foreign countries by local subsidiaries 
(IndiaCo).  The right to tax income from operations occurring in the Source (or colony) 
Country was allocated to the source country (the “origin country” in the Table) while 
taxation authority relating to other income was allocated to the place of residence of the 
parent company (“domicile country” in the Table). This categorization was not based on 
any analysis of the relative economic contributions of the various business activities to 
the actual profits earned by the respective companies. 
In the Mercantilist Paradigm Example in Section II, the classification-and-
assignment approach would result in IndiaCo having the right to tax profits attributable to 
                                                 
78 Id. at 39. 
79 “Origin” should be read as source country. 
80 “Domicile” should be read as residence country. 
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the production of cotton or its conversion into commercial products.  To the extent that 
profits were earned from the use of capital (corporate bonds), know-how (professional 
earnings), sale of goods in other countries, or dividends (corporate shares or public 
securities), the right to tax such items resided in the domiciliary or residence country 
(ImperialCo). 
The 1923 Economic Experts Report recognized that the classification-and-
assignment approach might misallocate income in a particular case, but the economic 
experts took comfort in the view that it was unclear at the outset which country would be 
a net beneficiary from an overly generous allocation of taxing jurisdiction. 81  
Furthermore, even if overly generous, the 1923 Economic Experts Report advocated that 
Option 2’s maximum allocation to the country of residence with respect to treaties 
entered into between developed countries that are on “equal footing” would represent a 
desirable outcome. 82   The report commented in passing that the classification-and-
assignment approach might provide taxpayers with a de facto tax election due to their 
ability to create intermediate holding companies in tax-favorable resident jurisdictions, 
but this did not cause the committee to abandon the approach.83  Thus, the categorization 
methodology set forth in the report failed to address the potential that the economic world 
could be composed of not only “origin” or “domicile” countries but also third countries 
that made no economic contribution to the production of income.  Accordingly, if 
ImperialCo in the Mercantilist Paradigm Example had established an international 
subsidiary in a third country that had no or minimal income tax, in essence, it would be 
viewed as a residence country. 
Seligman later explained that the objective in the 1923 Economic Experts Report 
was that “all intangible wealth, except real estate mortgages, should be assigned 
predominately or wholly, to domicile.” 84   Routine business profits could also be 
transferred away from source country taxation if they were earned in a manner that did 
not create a permanent establishment (“PE”) in the source country or were not 
attributable to immovable property.85  The 1923 Economic Experts Report disparaged 
source-based tax regimes as involving antiquated theories of taxation and predicted that 
source-based taxation would diminish in importance as semi-developed nations became 
more industrialized and as modern notions of the pure income tax became more widely 
understood and appreciated.86  These comments are insightful because they underscore 
that these economic experts of the time were attempting to introduce a grand experiment 
designed to transform the world.  The organizing principle of these experts and of 
residence countries formulating the policies of the League of Nations was clear: base 
erode colony countries for the benefit of imperial countries (themselves), the originators 
of capital and know-how (the “foundational premise”).87  
                                                 
81 Id. at 45–46. 
82 Id. at 48. 
83 Id. at 49. 
84 SELIGMAN, supra note 64, at 127. 
85 As will be developed below, the term PE refers to, in essence, taxable presence in the source 
country. 
86 1923 Economic Experts Report, supra note 67, at 51. 
87 The elements of the foundational premise, as it evolved, in subsequent years, are noted at Part 
VI, infra. 
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Another important element was that Great Britain in the 1920’s was a significant 
net capital exporter88 and attempted to tax resident corporations on a worldwide basis, 
and so it was in its national interest to promote a solution to international double taxation 
that allocated taxing jurisdiction over residual income to the residence country and away 
from the country of source. 
Before addressing the evolution of the classification-and-assignment approach 
over time, it is helpful to note that the League 1923 Economic Experts Report could have 
instead recommended that residual income of a global company be apportioned between 
the residence and source countries based on the relative economic contributions 
conducted in each country (the ICC model approach).  The report, however, rejected out 
of hand the idea of so apportioning residual income because “the methodology has no 
fundamental basis in economic theory which is capable of easy application.”89   
These statements disregarded experience.  Profit-split or formulary 
apportionment methodologies were commonly employed in tax treaties at the time.90  The 
ICC had pressed the League to adopt principles consistent with those of the ICC draft 
1923 resolutions that endorsed a formulary apportionment approach.91  Yet, the League 
1923 Economic Experts Report contained no serious discussions of these treaties or of 
the formulary apportionment approach advocated in the ICC’s draft 1923 resolutions.  
The rejection of a profit-split approach by the League 1923 Economic Experts Report 
was controversial.   
                                                 
88 SELIGMAN, supra note 68, at 138 (pointing out that this bias is particularly helpful to creditor 
countries like England).  The United States was in a similar posture.  In fact, one U.S. government official 
testified that at this time the United States exported approximately four times as much capital as it imported.  
See H. David Rosenbloom & Stanley I. Langbein, United States Tax Treaty Policy: An Overview, 19 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 359, 366 (1981). 
89 1923 Economic Experts Report, supra note 67, at 46.  The report recognized that the British 
Imperial Government actually utilized this approach, but ascribed its success to “the use of a common 
language, the existence of a common conception of income so that divergences are of the smallest character, 
the easy relations that exist of a political character to enable the necessary data to be determined—all these 
factors would put the easy working of [a profit-split or two-sided TP methodology] at a maximum in the case 
of the British Empire.  It is not to be expected that a similar ease in working could be found as between 
countries with diverse language, diverse income-tax systems, diverse conceptions of income and less 
effective political connections.”  Id. at 47.  This view of formulary apportionment-type TP methodologies 
continues to this day in the OECD TP Guidelines.  See generally OECD TRANSFER PRICING, supra note 6, at 
¶¶ 1.21, 4.06[3].  Nonetheless, formulary apportionment-type methodologies are in common use in the tax 
world.  They are commonly used in U.S. state taxation models, as discussed in Part XII.E.2, infra.  They are 
also on the table for broad utilization in the proposed European Union consolidated corporate income tax 
base, which would aggregate an MNE's combined income for EU purposes and then apply formulary 
apportionment principles to allocate the combined income.  In this manner, all pertinent functions would be 
taken into account for income allocation (TP) purposes.   
90 Mitchell B. Carroll, A Brief Survey of Methods of Allocating Taxable Income Throughout the 
World, in LECTURES ON TAXATION 131, 151–53 & 168–70 (Roswell Magill ed., 1932) (stating that fractional 
apportionment was the primary method of resolving double taxation for Spain and Switzerland and was also 
used by France; also providing an analysis of how Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland had all 
formulated significant profit-split methodologies); see also HERNDON, note 65, at 15 (describing a pre-
existing Germany-Holland treaty where income apportionment was used for a railroad between the two 
countries); SELIGMAN, supra note 68, at 138 (recognizing that Great Britain had employed formulary 
apportionment methods with respect to its colonies but still maintained that this method was not practical).  
As indicated below, there is today extensive experience in addressing such issues, principally involving the 
use of two-sided TP methodology in bilateral advance pricing agreement (APA) or double taxation cases 
(where one country asserts a claim to a higher share of residual profits and the dispute is resolved through a 
competent authority treaty resolution process). 
91 See 1923 ICC Proceedings, supra note 33, brochure 25, n. 29, at 10–12.  Indeed, the ICC 
referred to the principles espoused by Seligman, one of the League’s economists.  Id. 
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In 1925, the technical experts issued their first report to the League of Nations.92  
It stated that the residence country93 should be given primary jurisdiction over income but 
that the source country should have a right to tax income from real property, agriculture, 
and income from commercial and industrial undertakings.94  Furthermore, the League 
1925 Technical Experts Report recognized that numerous examples existed of efforts to 
utilize Option 3’s profit-split or formulary apportionment approach, including by Great 
Britain with its colonies, by Swiss cantons among themselves, and by several countries in 
Central Europe in numerous treaties.95  In fact, the report at one point stated that the 
method of apportioning profits “appeared at first sight to be the one which was most 
generally in use.”96 
Notwithstanding the numerous examples of profit-split methodologies and 
recognition of the risk of artificial allocations of income under a preset classification-and-
assignment approach, the League 1925 Technical Experts Report summarily rejected the 
idea of analyzing the possibility of adopting a profit-split methodology, stating that “we 
do not think that it would be possible to adopt generally such a very complicated [profit-
split methodology] system in the international sphere.”97  This comment was certainly not 
true at the time because the members of this committee had ample evidence to use to 
develop profit-split models that would fairly and accurately allocate income between the 
source and residence countries.  By suggesting that a profit-split apportionment approach 
was too hard, the committee was able to side-step further rigorous inquiry about whether 
this result could avoid the misallocation issues that the classification-and-assignment 
approach could create.  In any event, the League 1925 Technical Experts Report 
recommended that work should begin on developing a model income tax treaty along the 
lines it advocated.98 
V. COORDINATION OF THE LEAGUE AND THE ICC POSITIONS 
The ICC Committee on Double Taxation, chaired by Thomas Sewall Adams, met 
in May 1925.99  The U.S. delegation included the Chairman of the House Committee on 
Ways & Means (William R. Green). 100   The ICC Committee on Double Taxation 
accepted the preference for a residence basis of taxation, with the source country right to 
                                                 
92 W.H. Coates, Double Taxation and Tax Evasion: Report and Resolutions Submitted By the 
Technical Experts to the Financial Committee of the League of Nations, League of Nations Doc. 
C.115M.55.1925.II.A (1925) (hereinafter 1925 Technical Experts Report). 
93 Id. at 21 (stating that place of residency for a joint stock company meant its place of fiscal 
domicile, which would be determined as the place where “management and control of the business are 
situated”). 
94 Id. at 31. 
95 Id. at 12–14; see also the 1921 Austro–Hungary Treaty, discussed supra note 56; Mitchell B. 
Carroll, Methods of Allocating Taxable Income, Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises Vol. IV, 
League of Nations Doc. C.425(b) M.217(b) 1933 II.A. at 57–87 (1933); and the discussion of pre-existing 
income apportionment schemes supra note 90.  As will be indicated below, there is today extensive 
experience in addressing such issues, principally involving the use of two-sided TP methodology in bilateral 
advance pricing agreement (“APA”) or double taxation cases (where one country asserts a claim to higher 
share of residual profits and the dispute is resolved through a competent authority treaty resolution process). 
96 1925 Technical Experts Report, supra note 92, at 14. 
97 Id. 
98 1925 Technical Experts Report, supra note 92, at 29. 
99 Id. at 10–11. 
100 Id. at 11. 
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tax being strictly limited and not entitled to, in essence, impose a profit-split approach on 
the combined income of the foreign company.101 
The Third ICC Congress met in Brussels in June 1925,102 five months after the 
League 1925 Technical Experts Report was published.  A delegate from the Financial 
Committee of the League of Nations also attended.103  The proceedings noted that the 
League Committee of Technical Experts, following the work of the League’s 1923 
Economic Experts Report, had contacted the ICC with respect to the views of taxpayers 
(business).104  The ICC group met with the League Committee of Technical Experts in 
Geneva in April 1924 to present its views on double taxation.  Cooperation between the 
ICC and the League was recited in the proceedings of both.105 
The League 1925 Technical Experts Report, issued five months earlier, appears 
to have overstated the preference of the ICC, as least as of the Second ICC Congress in 
1923, for residence–based taxation.  It may be that this reflected the interim discussions, 
recited by the ICC, in which the ICC Committee on Double Taxation deferred to the 
League’s technical experts.  This view is supported by the following statement by T.S. 
Adams who described the “working agreement” between business (the ICC) and 
governments (the League) in the following manner: 
The working plan for the general elimination of double taxation . . . is 
based upon the frank recognition of the fact that the income-tax serves 
two purposes: it must satisfy the claim both of the country or origin and 
of the country in which the taxpayer resides; part of the income will 
inevitably be taxed where it is earned and part where the taxpayer 
resides.  This is the first time perhaps that full recognition has been given 
to the valid claims of the country of origin and the country of residence. 
The Committee of the International Chamber very clearly records its 
conviction that double taxation is particularly pernicious, because the 
burden is likely to be borne by the borrowing taxpayer or country.  It is 
essential that the interest of the debtor countries and business enterprises 
obliged to borrow [from the creditor countries and business enterprises, 
presumed to be at the place of residence], that double taxation should be 
obviated wherever possible. 
. . . . 
With respect to firms doing business in foreign countries, the Committee 
recommends that agencies not an integral part of the enterprises, 
established on the basis of commission only, should be exempt from 
taxation in the country where the agency is established, except in so far 
as the profits of the agent himself are concerned. Where the business 
enterprise maintains in a foreign country a genuine commercial or 
industrial establishment, the latter is to be taxed upon the profits derived 
                                                 
101 Id. at 7–8.  Italy reserved on the preference for residence, as it had in the League of Nations 
proceedings.  It proposed that different rules be applied for taxes in rem (on property) and in personam 
(everything else, including most cross-border business).  See 1925 ICC Proceedings, brochure 34, at 9 
[hereinafter ICC Brochure no. 34]. 
102 See generally ICC Brochure no. 34, supra note 101.. 
103 Id. at 10. 
104 See id. 
105 See id.; see also reference to the work of the ICC in 1925 Technical Experts Report, supra note 
92.  The discussions in Geneva are also discussed in ICC Brochure no. 34, supra note 101, at 34–35.  
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in the foreign country, but where an agency only is maintained, taxation 
is to be confined to the agent’s commission.106 
In short, the ICC eventually accepted that: (1) the primary right to tax profits 
from cross-border enterprise was in the residence country; (2) the source country could 
not seek information about profits earned by the enterprise outside the source country 
(that is, no profit split); and (3) in the case of what became a PE, the source country could 
tax only the income derived in its country.  The rationale for these conclusions seemed to 
arise from the fact that source countries were presumed to be importers of capital, which 
would be the fuel to generate profits.107 
VI. LEAGUE OF NATIONS EVOLUTION 
As noted, the League of Nations commissioned a broader group of technical 
experts that included the United States (represented by Adams108 and assisted by Mitchell 
B. Carroll) to create a model income tax convention.109  This group met in April 1927.  
The British technical expert, Sir Percy Thomas, continued to argue in favor of residence-
based taxation as had the League 1923 Economic Experts Report and the League 1925 
Technical Experts Report,110 as also accepted by the ICC, but finally on the last day of the 
                                                 
106 ICC Brochure no. 34, supra note 101, at 15; see also id. at 14, 16–17.  The text of the actual 
ICC resolutions is consistent with the explanations of T.S. Adams, see id. at 17–18, as are the resolutions of 
the League Technical Experts.  Id. at 19–21.  The only point of difference between the League of Nations and 
the ICC in the Geneva meetings concerned the taxation of a foreign enterprise having a “genuine commercial 
or industrial establishment” in another country.  Id. at 18 (Resolution 4 of the ICC).  The ICC position was 
that each country could tax only the portion of the income earned its territory.  An illustration of this position 
was offered by the British representative (Sir Algernon Firth): 
if a man had a commercial establishment (a factory, a shop, a bank) in a foreign 
country, that country might collect impôts réels on it.  If he only had an agent or permanent 
representative, the foreign country had no rights upon the profits of the firm in that country.  
Fancy the position of a firm having agencies in 20 different countries if it had to present in 20 
different fiscal authorities 20 balance sheets.  Would it be possible for any firm to keep any 
process secret?  The Committee admitted that it was unfair that an agent should work in a 
country and not be taxed there, but they recognized that it would be absolutely impossible for 
firms to produce the number of balance sheets that would be required if the suggestion of the 
Experts were adopted, and  so it was hoped most strongly that the meeting would adopt the 
[ICC] Committee recommendation. 
Resolution of the issue was, in essence, deferred to a subsequent League of Nations conference that 
would include a broader range of countries, including Germany, the South American countries, and, it was 
hoped, the United States.  See 1925 ICC Proceedings, supra note 31, brochure 43, at 15, 22.  These meetings 
appear to have been convened in 1927, anticipating resolution in 1928.  See International Chamber of 
Commerce, Resolutions Passed at the Stockholm Congress (June 27–July 2, 1927), brochure 60, at 22.  
107 See 1923 ICC Proceedings, supra note 33, brochure 25, at 7-13. 
108 For an excellent work on the contributions made by Adams to U.S. income tax policy, see 
Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 30.(one of the few academic analyses of the formative work of the League of 
Nations, which was focused on the need for reform of the U.S. international tax regime as opposed to the 
need for reform of the global treaty models; there is an excellent discussion of the role of source in the 
formulation of U.S. policy, as well as the  “essential dilemma” of residence vs. source). 
109 See Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 30,  at 1081. See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “All of a Piece 
Throughout: The Four Ages of US International Taxation,” 25 VA. TAX  REV. 313 (2005) (seeming to suggest 
that Mr. Carroll was an important collaborator with Professor Adams); see also The Double Taxation 
Conference: London, April 5–12, 1927, Memorandum from Mitchell B. Carroll to T.S. Adams,  at 19 (Sept. 
26, 1927) (unpublished manuscript available in T.S. Adams Papers, Yale University, Box 13, Sept. 1926–
1927 folder.)  
110 See, e.g., League of Nations Comm. of Experts on Double Tax’n & Fiscal Evasion, Minutes of 
the Tenth Meeting held in London at 5 p.m. on Tuesday April 12th, 1927, D.T./8th Session/P.V.10(1), at 6–7 
(available at T.S. Adams Collection, Yale University, Box 16, League of Nations Apr. 12, 1927 folder.) 
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conference a compromise was reached along the lines urged by the newest member of the 
committee, Adams.  He advocated that the source country should have the right to impose 
“impersonal taxes” (that is, withholding taxes) on the various classes of income while the 
country of residence should provide a foreign tax credit (“FTC”) for the withholding 
taxes paid to the source country. 111   Also, several experts championed a proposal 
endorsed by the ICC that a foreign enterprise should not be considered to have a PE in a 
source country simply because it transacts business in the source country through an 
independent agent,112 and the committee adopted this recommendation.113  The impact of 
this recommendation was to exempt from source country taxation all profits derived by a 
foreign enterprise through independent agents, 114  but, importantly, branches, affiliate 
companies, and dependent agents still constituted a PE under the draft convention.115  
Furthermore, the Fiscal Committee made it clear that a source country would have no 
right to tax business profits from industrial and commercial activities on a net basis 
unless the foreign parent had a PE in the  country.116 
After making these important clarifications, the Fiscal Committee issued their 
report on April 15, 1927, and accompanying their report was a draft model income tax 
treaty (the “1927 Draft Model Convention”) that utilized the classification-and-
assignment approach set forth in the League 1923 Economic Experts Report and the 
League 1925 Technical Experts Report but with the more narrow PE definition.117 
In October, 1928, the League of Nations’ technical experts met again and issued 
a final report.118  Importantly, each of the potential models continued the classification-
and-assignment approach that had by then been repeatedly endorsed.   
The 1928 Model Conventions became the benchmark for treaty negotiations in 
Europe, and these model conventions were instrumental in the development of the 
earliest U.S. tax treaties.119  Thus, the classification-and-assignment approach utilized in 
the 1928 Model Convention transformed treaty negotiations.  Once this treaty framework 
was in place, the balance of power between source and residence countries was 
significantly changed through a continuing redefinition of the scope of activities that 
would fall within the purview of a PE and through continuing efforts to minimize the 
amount of source-based withholding taxes that would apply to cross-border payments. 
The order of tax treaty principles that were so formulated could be distilled into 
five principles: 
                                                 
111 See Report Presented by the Comm. of Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, 
League of Nations Doc. C.216M.85.II.A, at 11 (1927) [hereinafter 1927 Technical Experts Report]; see also 
Memorandum from Mitchell B. Carroll to T.S. Adams, supra note 109, at 19. 
112 See League of Nations Comm. on Double Taxation and Fiscal Evasion, Minutes of the Third 
Meeting held at London on April 6th, 1927 at 3:30 p.m., League of Nations, DT/8th Session, P.V.3.(1), at 9-
10 (proposal made by M. Julliard representing the ICC and endorsed by Adams) (available in T.S. Adams 
Collection, Yale University, Box 16, League of Nations Apr. 4-6, 1927 folder.) 
113 See League of Nations Comm. on Double Tax’n & Tax Evasion, Minutes of the Fourth Meeting 
held in London on April 7th, 1927 at 3:30 p.m., League of Nations, D.T./8th Session/P.V.4.(1), at 2 
(proposed change to permanent establishment definition adopted) (available in T.S. Adams Collection, Yale 
University, Box 16, League of Nations Apr. 7 & 8, 1927 folder.) 
114 See Memorandum from Mitchell B. Carroll to T.S. Adams, supra note 109, at 6. 
115 Id. 
116 Id.  
117 1927 Technical Experts Report, supra note 111, at 10–11. 
118 Report Presented by the General Meeting of Government Experts on Double Taxation and Tax 
Evasion, League of Nations Doc. C.562M.178 1928 II (1928) [hereinafter League 1928 Report].  See 
generally Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 30, at 1023–24.  
119 See Rosenbloom & Langbein, supra note 88, at 365. 
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1. Source country should tax local operations, including property or  
other pertinent matters.  
2. Residual income should be earned by the country of residence, 
which provides the knowledge, capital, and global markets for the 
business. 
3. Presence of an interim holding company should be treated as a 
residence Country. 
4. Subsidiaries should not be treated as a PE120). 
5. TP is to be evaluated on a separate account basis (i.e., one-sided 
TP principles). 
The model treaties that eventually became the OECD Model, and subsequently 
the UN Model, are based on these five principles, which comprise the elements of the 
foundational premise. 
Not surprisingly, the effective tax rate strategies of MNEs evolved based on this 
treaty model, as contemplated in the work of the League of Nations. 
VII. THE HUNGARY PROBLEM 
On May 12, 1928, Poland and Hungary executed a tax treaty that used the 
framework of the 1927 Draft Model Convention.  The Hungary-Poland tax treaty is 
notable in that it turned the intended result of that convention on its head by tweaking its 
terms to give a preference to source-based taxation.121  To achieve this result the treaty 
provided that income from investments, savings accounts, and securities and all other 
“floating capital” would be taxed by the country in which the debtor was located 
(residence country).122   Business profits would be apportioned between the countries 
where a business entity had an establishment, and for this purpose the term 
“establishment” was defined to include subsidiary corporations that operated in the 
source country just as the 1927 Draft Model Convention had done.123  Furthermore, just 
like the 1927 Draft Model Convention, the term PE included all permanent 
representatives of the business entity whether or not the representative had the authority 
to bind the foreign company.124  The Hungary-Poland tax treaty went on to provide that 
the combined income of the nonresident company and its subsidiaries would be 
apportioned between the two countries based on the relative gross income derived from 
the various establishments,125 and the combined income would be determined using the 
general statement of accounts maintained by the business entities.126  Furthermore, if 
these accounts were not reliable, then the two countries would consult one another to 
determine a fair allocation of the income.127  This approach was, in essence, the 1923 ICC 
model. 
                                                 
120 See discussion in Section VII infra. 
121 Conventions between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Republic of Poland for the Prevention of 
Double Taxation in the Matter of Direct Taxation, May 12, 1928, 123 L.N.T.S. 47; for another 
contemporaneous attempt to achieve taxation that did not utilize the League of Nations’ model treaty, see 
Agreement between Spain and Italy Regulating the Fiscal Treatment of Companies, arts. 4, 5, Nov. 18, 1927, 
82 L.N.T.S. 27. 
122 Hungary-Poland Treaty, supra note 121, at art. 5.  
123 Id. art. 3.  
124 Id.  
125 Id. 
126 Id.  
127 Id. 
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The broad definition of PE to encompass the business operations of related 
corporations, the use of the global revenues of the overall related entities, and the use of a 
profit split based on gross revenues allowed Hungary and Poland to effectively achieve 
the Option 3 profit-split result that had been formulated (and rejected) in the 1923 
Economic Experts Report.  All of this was achieved within the framework of the League 
of Nations’ own 1927 Draft Model Convention. 
In a report dated October 26, 1929, the Fiscal Committee of the League of 
Nations noted that the Hungary-Poland convention had utilized the League of Nation’s 
model convention to promote a source-based taxation result.128  As a result, the Fiscal 
Committee concluded that the member nations needed a further explanation on how 
profits from industrial activities should be taxed.129   
The next year, in a report issued in May 1930, the Fiscal Committee of the 
League of Nations definitively adopted its narrower PE definition that excluded 
independent agents. 130   The Fiscal Committee then recommended that royalties on 
patents, copyrights, and other types of intangible property associated with a commercial 
and industrial undertaking unrelated to real property should be taxed only at the fiscal 
domicile (residence) of the recipient if the owner of the intangible property did not 
otherwise have a PE in the source country.131  It then established a subcommittee to 
determine whether the following further clarifying statement should be added to the PE 
definition: 
The fact that an undertaking has business dealings with a foreign country through  
local company, the stock of which it owns in whole or in part, should not be held to mean 
that the undertaking in question has a permanent establishment in that country.132 
Thereafter, the Fiscal Committee issued a report that set forth a revised draft 
model convention, which explicitly provided that a PE “does not include a subsidiary 
company.” 133   The treaty also maintained an exemption for withholding taxes on 
                                                 
128 Fiscal Comm., Report Presented to the Council on the Work of the First Session of the Comm., 
League of Nations Doc. C.516M.175.1929.II (1929), at 2. 
129 Id. at 2–3. 
130 Fiscal Comm., Report to the Council on the Work of the Second Session of the Comm., League 
of Nations Doc. C.340M.140.1930.II.A (1930), at 4.. 
131 Id. at 5-6; Fiscal Comm., Report to the Council on the Work of the Third Session on the 
Comm., League of Nations Doc. C.415M.171.1931.II.A. (1931) (adopting the proposed principles). 
132 Fiscal Comm., 1930 Report, note 124, at 9 (emphasis added).  Blau, the representative of 
Switzerland, requested that this provision should be considered because the ICC had adopted a resolution 
earlier in 1929 to the same effect.  See Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Committee of Experts on Double 
Taxation and Fiscal Evasion at 4:00 p.m. on Thursday, October 17th, 1929, F/Fiscal 1st Session/P.V.2,(1) 
League of Nations, at 3.  The next year, some members pressed for adoption of this clarifying statement 
without further study, but this proposal was rejected.  See Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the Comm. of 
Experts on Double Taxation and Fiscal Evasion at 3:30 p.m. on Wednesday, May 28th, 1930, F/Fiscal/2nd 
Session/P.V.6,(1) League of Nations, at 7.  Instead, the subcommittee that was established to address the 
allocation of profits would also consider the redefinition of a PE to exclude “affiliated companies.”  See 
Minutes of the Seventh Meeting of the Comm. of Experts on Double Taxation and Fiscal Evasion at 9:30 a.m. 
on Thursday, May 29th, 1930, F/Fiscal 2nd Session/P.V.7.(1), League of Nations, at 30–33 (Proposal 4 
adopted with  Flores de Lumus’s amendment). 
133 Fiscal Comm., Report to the Council on the Fourth Session of the Committee, League of Nations 
Doc. C.399.M.204.1933.II.A. (1933), at 6 [hereinafter League 1933 Report].  Prior to this meeting, Adams, a 
defender of  source-based taxation, died unexpectedly on February 8, 1933.  The United States asked Carroll 
to replace Adams as the U.S. representative to the Fiscal Committee.  MITCHELL B. CARROLL, GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVES OF AN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAWYER 71 (1978).  Shortly after this meeting, on November 6, 
1933, Dorn withdrew from the Fiscal Committee as a result of Germany’s decision to withdraw from the 
League of Nations entirely.  See Fiscal Comm., Resignation of Professor Dorn, Member of the Committee, 
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royalties.134  Furthermore, the report then attacked the Hungary treaty’s global, multi-
company allocation approach by setting forth an explicit framework for how business 
profits of a PE should be calculated: 
The fundamental principle laid down is that, for tax purposes, permanent 
establishments must be treated in the same manner as independent 
enterprises operating under the same or similar conditions, with the 
corollary that the taxable income of such establishments is to be assessed 
on the basis of their separate accounts.135 
The method of relying on separate accounts was defined by Carroll in his report 
submitted to the Fiscal Committee in the following manner: 
The method of separate accounting means taking the declaration of 
income, supported by the accounts of the local branch, as a basis of 
assessment.  This may entail a verification of the accounts and enquiry 
into the relations between the local branch and other establishments 
(branches or subsidiaries) of the parent enterprise, which involve, for 
example, consideration of the price at which goods have been invoiced to 
the branch and their original cost, and the amounts charged to the branch 
for services or representing a portion of general overhead expenses.136 
Carroll went on to state that the method of separate accounts was the method 
normally followed “in the country which has the largest experience in the taxation of 
income,” namely the United Kingdom, and characterized it as being the method used by 
countries that have “accountants of the highest professional standing.”137 
In its official report, the Fiscal Committee clarified that the arm’s length standard 
would be determined by assuming that the PE were a separate entity, thus rejecting the 
global allocation approach articulated in the Hungary-Poland Treaty.138   
In a report issued in June 1935, the Fiscal Committee endorsed the draft model 
income tax convention that had been submitted in 1933.139  The 1935 Revised Draft 
Model Treaty “fixed” the PE definition by excluding the mere ownership of subsidiaries 
and limiting the business profits allocable to a PE to only the profits in the company’s 
separate accounts.140 
The consequence of removing subsidiaries from the definition of a PE, 
determining business profits allocable to the subsidiary in terms of a stand-alone (or one-
sided TP) inquiry, essentially ignoring interim holding companies, and exempting 
royalties from source-based withholding taxation was to create significant tax planning 
opportunities.  By utilizing the investment structure set forth in Mercantilist Paradigm 
Example, a significant opportunity existed to base erode the colony country, which was 
                                                                                                                                     
League of Nations Doc. C.677.1933.II.A. (1933).  The departure of Adams and Dorn, both of whom showed 
some balance in terms of source-based taxation, occurred mid-stream during the transitional period when the 
League of Nations was moving away from its 1928 Model Convention and towards the 1935 Revised Draft 
Model Treaty.  
134 League 1933 Report, supra note 133, at 3–4. 
135 Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
136 4MITCHELL B. CARROLL, LEAGUE OF NATIONS FISCAL COMM., TAXATION OF FOREIGN AND 
NATIONAL ENTERPRISES 45 (1933) 
137 Id. at 47. 
138 See League 1933 Report, supra note 133, at 2. 
139 Fiscal Comm., Report to the Council on the Fifth Session of the Committee, League of Nations 
Doc. C.252M.124.1935.II.A. (1935), at 3, 5–7. 
140 Id. at 5-6. 
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the desired objective of the framers (principally imperial countries) of the foundational 
premise.141 
Carroll would later say that “the advocates of the method of separate accounting 
as the basic method for allocating taxable income have won a decided victory in the 
international sphere over the supporters of fractional apportionment” and that fractional 
apportionment “had been relegated to the place of a last-resort measure in the 
international sphere.” 142   In applying the arm’s length method, Carroll consistently 
employed transactional methods or one-sided TP methods, as he considered a profit split 
(a two-sided TP method) as a “rarely used” method that would only be utilized if no other 
transactional comparable could be found.143  
The international paradigm that framed subsequent discussions between 
developed and developing nations would contain the elements of the foundational 
premise.144  In concert, these elements of the 1935 Revised Draft Model Treaty shifted 
the balance of power away from source countries and toward the country of residence.  
Member nations were dutifully conforming.145 
The net result of the 1935 Revised Draft Model Treaty was that the bilateral 
principles had been established for the legitimacy of residence-based taxation.  In the 
process of developing TP policies to remove residual income from source countries and 
allocating it to the residence country (including interim holding companies in third 
countries treated as a residence country) MNEs were implementing the policies 
specifically approved and prescribed by the League of Nations.  Indeed, if they were to 
have done otherwise, application of the mutual agreement provisions of the model 
treaties would have enforced such policy orientation. 
VIII. HOMELESS INCOME:  THE NAGGING REALITY CHECK 
While the residence-based paradigm may have been established, there was a 
problem.  The model encouraged MNEs to remove earnings from “floatable capital” out 
of the source country and create homeless income.  The purpose behind the 1928 Model 
Tax Treaty was to avoid double taxation, not to create non-taxation.  Yet, the creation of 
homeless income is exactly what occurred as a result of the five elements noted above.146  
A “no taxation result” was viewed as a mistake, a fiscal fraud.147  Of course, this was a 
rather contradictory conclusion to the process that facilitated the creation of homeless 
                                                 
141 See infra Parts IV and VI. 
142 Carroll, supra note 23, at 473, 473 n.4 . The role of Carroll should not be underestimated.  He 
drafted Model 1-b of the 1928 Model Tax Treaty for Adams.  CARROLL, supra note 133, at 32.  Carroll’s 
study of attribution of profits was very significant in framing acceptance of the arm’s length standard by the 
League of Nations.  See id. at 70–71. He was the President of the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations 
from 1938 to 1946.  Id. at 71.  He was the first President of the International Fiscal Association. Id. at 32. 
Carroll was present in the drafting of the 1963 OECD Model Convention. He was also present in the 
meetings with Stanley Surrey to develop the U.N. model treaty.  U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Tax 
Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries: Second Report, at 26, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/137, U.N. 
Sales No. E.71.XVI.2 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 U.N. Second Report].  Carroll was also involved in the actual 
drafting of the eventual U.N. model treaty.  See U.N. Dep’t of Int’l Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Manual for the 
Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries, at 7, U.N. Doc. 
ST/ESA/94, U.N. Sales No. E.79.XVI.3 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 U.N. Manual]. 
143 See Carroll, supra note 23, at 483, 485–86. 
144 See infra Section IV. 
145 See Fiscal Comm., supra note 139, at 3-4 (stating that “existence of model treaties of this kind 
has proved of real use” and showing the number of treaties that are now conforming to the model treaty). 
146 See supra Part VI. 
147 Fiscal Comm., Report to the Council on the Sixth Session of the Committee, League of Nations 
Doc. C.450M.266 1936 II.A. (1936), at 1. 
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income, as noted above.  In response to the then growing problem, on October 9, 1936, 
the Assembly of the League of Nations adopted the following stinging resolution: 
The Assembly, 
Considering that efforts to reduce the obstacle to the international 
circulation of capital must not have the effect of increasing fiscal fraud; 
. . . . 
Requests the Fiscal Committee to pursue vigorously its work for the 
avoidance of double taxation as far as possible, and also its work on the 
subject of international fiscal assistance, in order to promote practical 
arrangements calculated, as far as possible, to put down fiscal fraud.148 
Thus, soon after the Fiscal Committee had dismantled the source-country tools to 
levy taxes on residual income related to movable capital (i.e., the foundational 
premise),149 the Fiscal Committee found itself being questioned by the Assembly about 
whether it had done enough to ensure that fiscal fraud (that is, homeless income) was 
being addressed with sufficient vigor. 
The Fiscal Committee agreed that tax evasion was achieved through income from 
movable capital.  It was then faced with a choice.  It could recognize that the taxpayer’s 
right to choose the country of residence represented a de facto tax election which, when 
coupled with the elimination of source country taxation, allowed the taxpayer to create 
homeless income.  Alternatively, it could double-down on its deference to residence-
based taxation.  The Fiscal Committee refused to alter its mindset, and instead proposed 
that each country should adopt domestic rules to address the problem of movable income.  
The response was a clear lack of interest in a country developing an infrastructure to 
track movable capital for a third country when there was no financial benefit that would 
inure to that country.150  
Recognizing that there was “insuperable opposition” to this solution, the Fiscal 
Committee suggested that a second-best solution would be to adopt exchange-of-
information agreements as part of the tax treaty network, though it held out little hope 
that this was a comprehensive solution.151   
Thus, the Fiscal Committee admitted that its only solution to the homeless 
income problem was unworkable.  Nonetheless, it remained unwilling to change its 
policy of promoting residence-based taxation over source-based taxation.152 
This ultimately led to the evolution of outbound (such as controlled foreign 
corporation (“CFC”), FTC, and related regimes) and inbound (such as earnings-stripping, 
thin capitalization, anti-avoidance, and related regimes) domestic legislation, often not 
subject to resolution in treaty-based dispute resolution procedures.153 
                                                 
148 Id. at 1 (emphasis added). 
149 See supra Part IV. 
150 Id. at 2. 
151 Report Presented by the Fiscal Committee to the Council During Its Seventh Session of the 
Committee, League of Nations Doc. C.490 M.331 1937 II.A. (October 16, 1937), at 2. 
152 The U.N. Ad Hoc Group of Experts would later comment that this discussion of international 
tax evasion was the last in-depth discussion of tax evasion and avoidance in international forums until the 
1970s.  See U.N. Dep’t of Int’l Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing 
Countries: Eighth Report, at 7–8, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/101, U.N. Sales No. E.80.XVI.1 (1980) [hereinafter 
1980 U.N. Eighth Report]. 
153 The relationship of these outbound and inbound regimes to tax base defense in the 21st century 
is discussed at Wells & Lowell, Homeless Income and Tax Base Erosion, supra note 10, at 584–94.  
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IX. COMPOUNDING THE MISTAKE OF HOMELESS INCOME 
Interestingly, the ICC, after being silent on the subject of double taxation since 
1925, addressed the subject of homeless income in 1951.154  It noted that a country should 
draw its tax frontier vis-à-vis foreigners so as to exempt from domestic taxation a broad 
range of essentially base-stripping mechanisms.  In addition, a country should also not 
inquire “into the total income of the non-residents.”155  In recognition of the flaw in the 
foundational premise of residence-based taxation caused by intermediary companies (i.e., 
homeless income), the ICC proposed that “intermediary countries” should be treated as 
the residence country and should not tax subsequent distributions of income.156  
This proposal was submitted to the Fiscal Commission of the then new United 
Nations.157  In essence, the ICC proposed that an intermediary country, even if it had no 
or a low effective tax rate, should be treated as the residence country.  This emboldened 
effort to obtain explicit protection for a low-taxed intermediate holding company 
structure demonstrates that homeless income tax planning had by this time become well 
understood and of significant importance to the business community. 
In any event, the ICC 1951 proposal had been an element of the foundational 
premise from inception, but in 1951 is was clearly and explicitly framed. 
X. POLICY EVOLUTION IN THE 1951 – 2012 PERIOD 
In the period since 1951, global tax treaty policy has stood still.  There have been 
domestic tax base defense efforts in the form of ever-tightening CFC, FTC, earning-
stripping, and related outbound and inbound regimes, as well as a global effort to police 
the perceived base-stripping activities of MNEs via the introduction of broad-based TP 
documentation, examination, and penalty regimes.158  The near universal questioning of 
the extant model tax treaty policy was germinated by the tensions noted at the beginning 
of this article.159 
In this regard, it is also worth noting, though beyond the scope of this article, that 
many former residence countries, including most OECD member countries, are 
increasingly adopting policies designed to attract economic activity to their own borders 
and abandoning efforts to impose domestic taxation of an extra-territorial basis (such as 
the outbound and inbound regimes noted above).  This is plainly evident in the current 
international taxation proposals in the United States of the Obama administration as well 
as proposals being considered on a bi-partisan basis in Congress, which include 
conversion of the current global taxation model to a “territorial” model, utilization of a 
“patent-box” regime to provide lower domestic taxation for creation, in essence, of jobs 
related to intellectual property.160  Indeed, one of the most pervasive U.S. tax regimes of 
                                                 
154 See Unilateral Relief from Double Taxation, ICC Statement and Report of the Comm'n on 
Taxation 1951 [hereinafter 1951 Unilateral Report].   
155 Id. at 2.   
156 See 1951 Unilateral Report, supra note 154, at 10–11.   
157 See 1951 Unilateral Report, supra note 154, at 11.   
158 See OECD TRANSFER PRICING, supra note 6, at ch. 14 (listing the requirements of 70+ 
countries). 
159 See supra Part I. 
160 See LOWELL ET. AL, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING, supra note 2, at ¶ 2.02[22].  
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recent vintage is the so-called FATCA imposition of withholding taxes on U.S. source 
investment income.161 
These evolutions stand as mute testimony to the reality that the world has 
changed since the 1920s.  The former source-colony countries have in many cases 
become residence-imperial countries, as many creditor countries of that era have become 
debtor countries. In the Mercantilist Paradigm noted above,162 a case could certainly be 
made that, in many respects, India has taken the place of England (as has China taken the 
place of the United States). 
XI. FOUNDATIONAL PREMISE UNDER ORIGINAL ICC APPROACH 
As noted above, 163  the foundational premise had several elements. These 
elements would have been entirely different under the original ICC approach as follows: 
1. Source country should tax functions actually performed in that 
country local operations; 
2. Residual combined income should be allocated between earned 
by the country of source and the country of residence by agreement of 
the countries or on the basis of a specified factor;  
3. Presence of an interim holding company should be ignored or 
treated as the source country and its treaty partner country determine 
treated as a residence country; 
4. Treatment of subsidiaries Susidiaries should not be treated as 
permanent establishments is no longer relevant; and 
5. TP is to be applied on a combined basis. 
Needless to say, had the OECD and UN model treaties been developed based on 
these principles, the tension of today would be quite different.   
XII. POLICY EVOLUTION IN THE FUTURE 
As in the post-World War I period, there is today a global need for economic 
growth.  Designing policies to generate growth is complex.  Certainly, one important 
element is international tax policy.  All members of the international taxation community 
have a common interest in finding a solution to the current tension that is appropriate to 
the economics and realities of the early twenty-first century, not trying to continually 
paper-over the policies of the early twentieth century. 
In view of the history of the current OECD and UN model treaties, it is not 
surprising that there is tension between source countries, residence countries, the OECD, 
the UN, and MNEs with respect to international taxation.  It is inevitable that, in due 
course, there will be systematic re-examination of global tax treaty policy.  Hopefully, 
this will occur in a context where all countries, residence, source, or otherwise, can come 
together and craft an order of global taxation that fits the world as it is.  The forum for 
these discussions will remain to be determined. 
As the process evolves, we respectfully submit that there are several conceptual 
challenges that will need to be thoughtfully addressed, including the following: 
                                                 
161 See Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act of 2010, Pub, L. No. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71.  
See generally CYM LOWELL & MARK R.MARTIN, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: PRACTICE & PROCEDURE ¶ 
7.05[1][f] (2012).  
162 See supra Part II. 
163 See supra Parts II.A and VI. 
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A Purpose of the Foundational Premise 
The first conceptual challenge is to recognize that the existing model treaties, and 
the original TP rules to implement those treaties, were purposefully skewed.  Prior to the 
work of the League of Nations, several treaties had engaged in profit-split or formulary 
apportionment methodologies. 164   This was in earlier times the dominant method of 
allocating income from cross-border activities.  Homeless income should not survive in 
such a world and appears not to have existed under such methodologies.  Rather, income 
was allocated to the country where the underlying economic activity occurred.  PE 
concepts were not relevant, as they are largely a function of the foundational premise.   
The victors of WWI wanted to reshape the world into their mercantilist mindset.  
Their solution was that residual income should belong to the country of residence, not to 
the country where the economic activity occurred.  One-sided TP methods served their 
purpose because source countries would focus only on the in-country subsidiary as the 
“tested party” to be allocated a routine return.  All residual income by default went to the 
residence country (the “untested party” to use consistent TP terminology) without 
principled examination of overall function, risk, or investment. 165  
It is important to recognize that this was a purposeful step that served the interest 
of the capital exporting nations which wanted to maximize the potential allocation of 
residual income to their own countries.  The discussion in the original archives is 
amazingly frank.166  In other words, the original “earning strippers” (when viewed from 
the standpoint of source countries of today) were the government officials of capital 
exporting nations circa 1920s.  To a significant extent, the governments that now pillory 
MNEs for creating homeless income were the framers of the mercantilist approach to 
international taxation that created the opportunity in the first place. 
Can the residence countries of yesteryear evolve to embrace a new model?  The 
answer to this conceptual issue is clear.  It is in the affirmative and has already occurred, 
as most of these countries have already embraced a territorial model, as will be noted 
below.167 
B. Source Country Emergence to Residence Country 
Another conceptual challenge to serious re-engineering of our model treaties is 
the economic migration of many source (or colony) countries from the 1920s period, in 
which the foundational premise was born, to their current status as residence (capital 
exporting) countries.  For example, India was the model colony country in the 1920s 
discussions.168  Like the other BRICS and many source countries of today, it is a serious 
economic power intent upon defending its own tax base, just as were the original 
residence countries in the 1920s. 
                                                 
164 See supra Part VII. 
165 See Double Taxation, in International Chamber of Commerce, Resolutions Passed at the 
Stockholm Congress (June 27–July 2, 1927), brochure 60, ch. V, at 21.  The terminology in the text is stated 
in current terms adapted from the words actually used in 1927.  
166 Mr. Carroll would later say that “the advocates of the method of separate accounting as the basic 
method for allocating taxable income have won a decided victory in the international sphere over the 
supporters of fractional apportionment” and that fractional apportionment “had been relegated to the place of 
a last-resort measure in the international sphere.”  Carroll, supra note 23.  See also discussion of the 
importance of Mitchell B. Carol, supra note 142.   
167 See supra Part XII. 
168 See supra Parts II and III. 
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This emergence is a transformative element of the treaty policy dialogue.  Many 
of these countries are not OECD members.  The challenge here is likely to be which 
countries will be the driving forces in determining the appropriate treaty policy for the 
future.  Will it be the OECD, the UN, a new organization reflecting the interests of the 
BRICS and source countries, or a communal effort of all of parties? 
C. Territorial Taxation: A Confusing Race to the Bottom 
A third conceptual challenge is the trend toward territorial taxation.169  In such a 
world, a residence country relinquishes its right, under the foundational premise, to assert 
taxation on residual income from economic activities that have no nexus to its 
jurisdiction other than stock ownership.  This process, which results from countries 
competing with one another for MNE headquarters locations, amounts to an international 
race to the tax bottom.170 
From a treaty policy standpoint, this is rather confusing.  The residence countries 
of the post-World War I era demanded the foundational premise.  As the economic world 
evolved, including the emergence of former source countries as residence countries, 
many of the authors of the foundational premise have abandoned its critical objective of 
taxing foreign source income. 
Have these countries already abandoned the foundational premise? 
D. Secret World Provides Guidance for the Way Forward? 
In the real world of today, major TP controversies between treaty countries are 
inevitably resolved via the mutual agreement provisions of the model treaties.171  The 
proceedings are commonly referred to as involving the competent authorities, referring to 
the tax officials of the respective countries who are competent (authorized) to resolve 
potential double taxation cases. 
In our experience in handling such cases around the world, the inevitable result is 
reached by the respective countries undertaking two-sided TP analysis to determine the 
appropriate amount of income to be allocated to its own domestic companies (i.e., 
subjected to domestic taxation).  The results of these proceedings are necessarily secret, 
in the sense that there is no publication of the results (which are confidential taxpayer 
information), except in the form of broad statistical reports which are meaningless as a 
practical matter. 
On the other hand, those actually involved in the process (as private or public 
parties) understand that the essential concepts of the original ICC proposal reflect the 
means by which real cases are actually resolved.  In other words, there may be lip service 
to the foundational premise, but it is not followed in inter-governmental negotiations. 
In other words, competent authorities, unaided by unworkable policy paradigms, 
have been left to fend for themselves to develop administratively workable concepts to 
resolve complex cases.  This process is actually efficient in most developed countries, 
though it is just beginning in the BRICS and many other source countries.  
                                                 
169 See LOWELL ET AL., U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING, supra note 2, at ¶ 2.02[22]. 
170 See, e.g., Jacques Malherbe, Philippe Malherbe, Hank Verstraelen & Pascal Fues, Business 
Operations in Belgium, 953 TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO (BNA) at V.G- (setting forth special tax incentives to 
attract MNE headquarter functions to Beligium); John Ryan, Robert O’Shea & Aidan Fahy, Business 
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171 See Richard M. Hammer et al., OECD TRANSFER PRICING, supra note 6, at ¶¶ 12.03 and 12.05. 
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Can the competent authority model serve as a useful guide in developing treaty 
policy for the future? 
E. Perceptions of Homeless Income 
As noted earlier, there are today persistent drumbeats pillorying MNEs for their 
global effective tax rate planning policies.  The essential question here is whether such 
criticism is appropriate.  Whether one’s answer is affirmative or negative is largely 
irrelevant from a global tax treaty policy standpoint.  Why?  Because the behaviors in 
question were specifically encouraged by the League of Nations model and enshrined in 
the current OECD and UN models.  The result has been the growth of homeless income.  
Perhaps the most difficult conceptual challenge for treaty and international tax policy in 
the future will center around how to address homeless income.   
In Illustration C,172 we framed homeless income in terms of the allocation to 
HoldCo.  We assumed that India and Holdingland had agreed that the allocation between 
the two countries should be 50:50, which allocated 450 to HoldCo.  In the absence of 
such agreement, the ICC approach would have required an allocation of the combined 
income on a notional basis such as sales.   
For purposes of discussion, assume that the 450 allocated to HoldCo is subject to 
a low rate of taxation in Holdingland.  In this event, the treaty policy question will be 
how the homeless income should be addressed.  The answer will likely depend on the 
perspective of the respondent.   
1. Resident Country Perspective 
A residence country may perceive that any global income not subjected to 
taxation or covered by treaty should be fully subject to tax by it with appropriate foreign 
tax credit relief provided.  There is significant scholarly support for this perspective.173 
There are practical problems with this perspective.  One is that residence 
countries have never treated their domestic MNEs in a consistent manner.  Rather, there 
are material differences in the international taxation regimes of almost all residence 
countries.  The result has been competitive advantage or disadvantage depending on 
where a MNE is incorporated. 
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In addition, if a residence country attempts to tax homeless income, taxpayers 
have the ability to simply “elect out” of that particular country and incorporate in a more 
taxpayer-friendly jurisdiction.174  Since the country of residence is effectively a taxpayer 
election as to which many countries acquiesce, there is international competition to 
attract multinational headquarter companies.  A driving feature of this effort is the 
provision of incentives for such relocation.  In this regard, the movement to a territorial 
model175 reflects a determination by such residence countries to trade their theoretical 
ability to tax extra-territorial income to attract high-paying, white-collar headquarter and 
research jobs to their country.  Any single country cannot realistically stand alone in the 
wake of this race to the bottom.  An effort to do so is likely futile and serves only to 
disadvantage that country vis-à-vis competitive jurisdictions.  
Accordingly, even if one accepts that residency-based taxation as a conceptual 
solution for homeless income in an ideal world, the real world has already largely 
abandoned the model.176 
2. Source Country Perspective  
A source country is likely to believe that it should be able to tax residual income 
arising from functional activity taking place in its country.  This is reflected in the tax 
policies increasingly asserted by the BRICS countries. 177   The BRICS have recently 
announced an initiative to develop a cooperate approach on issues related to international 
taxation, transfer pricing, exchange of information, and tax evasion and avoidance.178 
Source countries may be uniquely situated to enact tax rules that treat all 
economic competitors in its marketplace similarly.179  For example, if a source country 
(such as Holdingland in Illustration C180) were concerned about the possibility that 
profits allocated to HoldCo might be homeless income, then it could adopt a rule to re-
                                                 
174 The powerful tax benefits afforded to inversion transactions, in which a MNE changes its place 
of residence, inevitably for tax reasons, from a high tax to a low tax country, reflects that the last days of the 
existing paradigm are at hand as MNEs can self-help themselves into a territorial result either through their 
own inversion transactions or face the prospect of acquisition by foreign competitors.  In either scenario, 
there will be an expansion of homeless income.     
175 See supra note 170. 
176 One element of a future treaty policy debate addressing homeless income will be the role of 
regimes that have evolved over the past 60 years to “backstop” the residence country tax bases out of concern 
that the TP rules were not adequate for this task.  Such regimes include the so-called controlled foreign 
corporation rules of many residence countries, as well as other related regimes.  It is to be hoped that an 
effective resolution of the homeless income matter would eliminate the need for these complex and 
overlapping regimes. 
177 See supra notes 7–8. 
178 See Press Info. Bureau, Gov't of India Ministry of Fin., Heads of the Revenue of Brics Countries 
Identifies Seven areas of tax policy and tax Administration for Extending their Mutual Cooperation; joint 
Communique issued after Two Day meeting of the heads of Revenue of Brics Countries,January 18, 2013 
(announcing the cooperation agreement between Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), reprinted at 
2013 WTD 15-27, Tax Doc. 2013-1498. 
179 The increasing boldness of source countries, particularly the BRICS, to apply their own transfer 
pricing rules is becoming increasingly obvious.  See, e.g., Comm, of Experts on Int'l Cooperation in Matters, 
Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing, E/C.18/2012/CRP.1 (October 2012), available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax/documents/bgrd_tp.htm.  Chapters 1-9 of this manual were written by the UN 
Committee on Experts and the transfer pricing approaches advocated therein largely support the OECD 
approach to transfer pricing.  Chapter 10 was written by select BRIC countries and the principles articulated 
in this chapter 10 are fundamentally inconsistent with the principles advocated in the first nine chapters. 
180 See supra Part II.A. 
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allocate any profits allocated to HoldCo back to ColonyCo if the HoldCo profits were are 
not subject to meaningful resident country taxation.181  
Alternatively, the source country could subject all 900 of profits in Illustration C 
to taxation by employing “force of attraction” concepts with foreign tax credit relief 
provided for taxes paid by Holdco in the resident country.182   
3. MNE Perspective 
MNEs reacted to the foundational premise in a manner to achieve their effective 
tax rate objectives, including taxing maximum advantage of the potential benefits of 
homeless income. 
Can MNEs as a group accept a new paradigm that would eliminate, over time, 
the benefits of their homeless income generating models?  Hopefully, the multinational 
community would be a willing and active participant in the process.183  The ultimate 
concern of business is likely to be the presence of a level playing field, so that no one 
company is disadvantaged vis-à-vis its competitors due to geographic location or other 
non-business considerations. 
4. OECD/UN Perspective 
Homeless income has arisen from the structure of the existing model treaties, as 
discussed throughout this article.  The OECD and UN have been the global leaders in 
treaty policy in modern times.  Will they, together or separately, be willing to initiate or 
embrace an updating of model treaty policies to reflect the world of the 21st century?  
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons noted immediately above, the treaty model of the post-World 
War I era is bound to undergo evolution.  At this point in time, it appears that no group is 
happy with its consequences.  The original residence countries have largely abandoned its 
benefit, source countries of the 1920s reject the model outright, the G-8 and G-20 have 
proclaimed that inappropriate effective tax rate policies have been spawned by the 
Foundational Premise, emerging countries and their supporters or financiers decry the 
impact of existing models upon their economic growth potential, and MNEs are stuck in 
the middle, pilloried for following the rules.184  In short, the likelihood of future life of 
policies developed for the self-benefit of the economic powers of an earlier era (when 
airplanes were a novelty, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill were mere boys, and 
the sinking of the Titanic was recent, unbelievable news) seems remote. 
In the inevitable re-examination process, there will be a fascinating range of 
political, economic, and business issues to be addressed.  Tax administrations will need to 
ascertain how their resources can be redeployed to foster economic growth.  MNEs will 
                                                 
181 Such a proposal would be very similar to the “throw-back rules” that apply in several states in 
the United States where income that is apportioned to a particular state is “thrown back” to the first state if 
the state of initial apportionment does not seek to tax such apportioned profits.  See generally Walter 
Hellerstein, The Quest for ‘Full Accountability’ of Corporate Income, 63 ST. TAX NOTES 627 (2011); 
Hamilton, MTC Launches Projects on Associate Nexus, Throwback Rule, TAX ANALYSTS, Doc. No 2011-
16136 (2011). 
182 Before the enactment of the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-809, 80 Stat. 
1539, a so-called “force of attraction” rule applied so as to tax all of the U.S. income as business income at 
graduated rates.  See generally Thomas Bissell, U.S. Income Taxation of Nonresident Alien Individuals, 907 
TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO (BNA) at II. 
183 See Wells & Lowell, supra note 10.  
184 See supra Part XII. 
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need to assess the impact of new treaty concepts on their global effective tax rate 
planning models.  Finally, organizations such as the OECD and UN will need to assess 
the impact of such developments on their own role in international taxation. 
The critical question is who will initiate the evolution to come.  All countries are 
anxious to protect their respective tax bases.  At the present time, it appears that the 
BRICS and source countries have planted their stake in the sand, rejecting the existing 
order and declaring an intention to update the rules that apply to their own tax base 
defense.  The OECD appears to be principally driven by the need to defend its member 
country tax bases, hoping, no doubt, that BRICS and source countries will ultimately 
follow its lead.185  If it fails to heed the needs of the evolving order (BRICS and source 
countries), the hegemony of the OECD may be lost in the process. 
As always, the study of history provides illumination for the future, provided that 
the lessons are not forgotten or ignored.  The learning that can be derived from the 
policies developed in the 1920s is that tax revenues will follow treaty policy design. 
 
                                                 
185 See supra note 4. 
